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Under the slogan equal pay for equal work, the Scandinavian countries
has strived for small wage di¤erences between di¤erent sectors.
The origin of solidaristic wage policies can be found in the 1930s, where
internationally competing industrial sectors were afraid that wage claims in
shielded sectors, as construction, could become too high and ultimately
hurt the export sectors.
Solidaristic wage setting appear appealing from a fairness view point, but
the heighday of these politics the 1950s and 1960s also were times with
rapid growth. Was this luck or coincidence? Had the Scandinavian countries
discovered a winning recipe?
In this thesis we will look at the welfare implication of compressed wages.
The approach we have used also gives us the opportunity to look at im-
plications of globalisation, and how globalisation and wage compression are
interlinked.
Wage compression will, through changes in production costs, change the
distribution of production within the economy. We nd that, not surprisingly,
compressed real wages gives less variance of output prices across industries.
This result by it self makes the consumer worse o¤, as the possibility of
ix
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substitution towards cheaper goods is lost. What, on the other hand, is sur-
prising, is that the compressed prices have other general equilibrium e¤ects
that are strong enough to make the end outcome higher consumer utility.
When studying globalisation, wage compression has especially one note-
worthy e¤ect. When wages are not compressed, globalisation creates higher
wages in all sectors.1 When wages are compressed, we nd that in some cases
globalisation will give lower wages to workers outside the unions.
To investigate the issues as these, we need a model where the economy
is described as imperfectly competitive (where agents act strategically) and
where we can study general equilibrium e¤ects. Models combining there
traits are rare, but research is moving in this direction. When wages are
compressed, this will have implications both directly as a change in produc-
tion costs, and indirectly through readjustments in labour demand. Unless
we can look at both partial equilibrium e¤ects and general equilibrium e¤ects
in the same model, we could not nd the dominating e¤ect in cases where
the two pull in di¤erent directions.
1This result was found by Naylor (1999) in an partial equilibrium model, and
is highly critizied. The objections will be presented later on.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Nordic model, the Scandinavian model, the Swedish model, it has many
names, but the content, and the fascination for it, is the same. The story
of the Scandinavian countries where focus seems to be on solidarity, has
managed to bring with it impressive growth. Is it really possible for a welfare
economy based on naivistic solidarity, to prosper? Or is it all luck and
coincidences? Apparently there still is no consensus on the subject.
Even though solidaristic wage setting was implemented in several places,
the programme has been particularly successful in Sweden and Norway after
the Second World War. Both countries had a social democratic government
and a well established welfare state before the war. The expression "solidaris-
tic wage policy" was rst used in Sweden.1 Norwegian economists looked to
their successful neighbour when they searched for ways to repair the economic
situation in the aftermath of the war. The programme includes a number of
measures, but the heart of it was the ideology of "equal pay for equal work".2
In Norway, the prelude of the regulated wage system started in 1935,
when an agreement between LO, the labour association, and N.A.F.3, the
employer union made an agreement to cooperate in wage negotiations on
rm level across the sectors.4 In Sweden, a similar agreement was made
in 1938, between their labour union and employer federations LO and SAF.
Even though the parties were not under government control, these agreements
1Schulten (2002)
2Meidner (1993)
3N.A.F. is now a part of NHO, etstabished 1989.
4Moene (2007)
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lead to highly centralised wage bargaining in both countries.5
The pre-war years in Norway was characterised by social reforms and
economic growth. Norway experienced a steady growth the in both real
capital and GDP the entire 20th century. Before the war, growth can be
explained as catch-up. The war years caused an abrupt standstill in growth.
But while the economy was down, the ideas of how to get it up and running
again when the war was over, ourished.
Sweden was neutral during the war, and was not hit at hard as the Nor-
wegian economy. But as the threat was present, and trade partners were
a¤ected, the economy had to be adapted to war-time conditions.6 This was
done by massive government regulations. The war-time economy was a suc-
cess with good utilisation of resources. While unemployment was a problem
before the war, they now experienced near full employment. Because regu-
lation seemed to work, the idea arose they could work also in a peacetime
setting. Rehn (1957) describes how an important part of the regulations had
been to reduce di¤erences in income. Gösta Rehn, and fellow Swedish trade
union confederation economists, Rudolf Meidner, were the front promoters
and theorists behind the ideas of solidaristic wage policy.7
Norwegian politics were heavily inuenced by the Swedish success. Sev-
eral important principles for economic control were developed by the govern-
ment in cooperation with the trade unions.8 The post war growth in Norway
was exceptional. The period was also characterised by an increase in labour
productivity above the earlier trend.9
In the post war period in Sweden, regulations were reduced but in no way
terminated. An important justication for this was the improved employ-
ment situation. Even with less regulation, the industries that had tradition-
ally received smaller pay-checks had strengthened their bargaining position.
Combined with the ideal of equal pay for equal work, the compressed wages
were maintained. As an example, Rehn (1957) mentions how workers in the
sheltered sectors lost some of their relative advantage compared to workers
in heavier industries.
Contrary to what was expected, unemployment turned out not to be a
problem in Sweden. Being relatively unharmed by the war, exporting rms
5Meidner (1993)
6Meidner (1993)




faced massive output demand, this lead to excess labour demand, and trou-
bles with ination.10 In an attempt to restrain wage growth, the govern-
ment, unable to limit wages directly, signalled that wage increases would be
followed by massive tax increases. The unions decided that there was no
point to wage increases, and in 1949, a central-union bargained wage freeze
was implemented. During the wage freeze, rm level negotiations resulted
in higher wages for some union members. Inevitably, the wage freeze was
followed by a wage explosion when the workers not favoured by the rm level
negotiations were to catch up with the others.11
In the early 1950s, in order for the ination not to get out of hand, a
programme that later was to be known as the Meidner-Rehn model was
implemented. Now wage negotiations were moved from rm level to central-
union level, thus creating more coordinated wage negotiations. It is at this
point the true solidaristic wage setting, and "equal pay for equal work" be-
gins. As a consequence, the sectors that were engaged in trade had to set
the standard for union wages. If the standard were to be set according to
the workers in the higher paid industries, the wage would have put a lid
on export as the internationally competing industries would have lost large
market shares to foreign rms.12
Though Norway had practiced union wage compression for some time, the
formal distinction between rms that trade, and rms that do not was not
made until in the early 1960s. Aukrust (1977) draws a picture of an industry
that was, and is, divided into two sectors, one that is exposed to foreign
competition, and one that was shielded from it. It was recognised that the
foreign competition in the open sectors resulted in lower wages compared to
workers in the shielded sectors, while productivity in the open sector was in
fact higher. In Sweden, Lindbeck expressed that unions should rely on wage
policy based on the solidarity principle, implying that the labour unions in
sectors with low wages and prot should not hesitate to push for as high
wages as those prevailing in other sectors.13 He argued that since the wage
di¤erence had nothing to do with productivity, it was hard to justify. At the
same time, Lindbeck accepted wage di¤erences based on productivity level,
and had no objections towards wage di¤erences within the sectors.




13Lindbeck (1968, p. 20)
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the 1960s when what Hibbs and Locking (1996) call a shift from an ideology
of "equal pay for equal work" to an ideology of "equal pay for all work" took
place. The idea was to improve the conditions for the lowest paid workers,
and even though the intention was noble, such wage setting has negative
implications for e¢ ciency.14
Exactly when the system in Sweden failed is hard to pin down. According
to Hibbs and Locking (1996) this happened in 1983. Meidner (1993) blames
the economic crisis in the 1990s, and claims that after years of decay the
centralised bargaining in Sweden collapsed in the early 1990s. Norway did
not experience the same sudden change. Ination troubles during the rapid
growth in the 1980s had lead to a wage conict. After rough negotiation,
wages were set high, and the industry su¤ered. In the following years, both
parties wanted to keep the centralised wage bargaining. Employees because
they had been favoured in the conict, and employers because they relied on
a strong union in their weakened position.15
In these days, the principles of the Rehn-Meidner model have gained
renewed interest. According to Olberg (2007), discussions around a new
form of regulations in the Nordic countries, has engaged in a second round
of evaluating solidaristic wage setting. The discussion has changed with the
changes in the economy. Because of globalisation, the issue of trade has been
of increasingly interest. Though the ideology is still important, Hibbs and
Lockings16 discovery that too much equalisation can have unwanted e¤ects,
has turned the focus more towards growth.
1.1 Theory
The implications of solidaristic wage policy have been widely studied. The
eld has been particularly interesting due to the rapid growth Norway and
Sweden experienced in the period compressed wages were implemented. A
discussion of whether this was because of, or despite of the wage setting policy
emerged. Mobilisation of labour and increased exports managed to maintain
rapid growth in spite of the wage policies, or was the growth amplied or even
created by the wage policy. In both countries, the aftermath of the war had
created a complex economic situation that makes it di¢ cult to distinguish
14Hibbs and Locking (2000)
15Olberg (2007)
16Hibbs and Locking (2000)
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what e¤ects the wage policy had.
The theoretical discussion has focused mainly on growth. This is not
very surprising as this was one of the easiest observable characteristics of
the period, and also because one of the ideas behind wage compression was
to promote e¢ ciency. The strong government control can be compared to a
major economic experiment,17 and the empirical data18 indicate that it just
might have worked.
Of course, since the ideology behind the wage bargaining was to promote a
more equitable distribution of resources, the welfare aspect is also important,
but at the same time not as tractable. One approach has been to divide the
work force into two groups, high skill, and low skill workers, and evaluate
what happens to the two.
Further we have the increasingly relevant subject of globalisation. Par-
ticularly in small, open economies like Sweden and Norway, factors that
inuence international competitiveness have massive e¤ects on the economy.
So, growth, welfare and globalisation are three aspects to consider within
the context of solidaristic wage setting, but before going into these, a few
basic insights on unionisation is called for.
1.1.1 Unions
In an ideal market with perfect competition, there is a consensus that unions
will only distort the markets, and make the economic surplus smaller. By
setting a union wage higher than the market clearing wage, production will
decrease, and there will be an e¢ ciency loss. If unions are market distortions,
can they create a more e¢ cient economy? The answer is yes, if the initial
situation is not one of perfect competition, unions may make the aggregate
production rise.
After the second world war, research on unionisation was a fairly active
eld, but the interest declined towards the 1970s. The problem, according
to George Johnson (1975) was that there was no agreement on formalisation
of bargaining tactics and union goals. When these problems were overcome,
and a theoretical foundation was laid, the eld expanded again. As models
became more detailed, Oswald (1985, p. 184) found that Only the simplest
kinds of general equilibrium models (...) generate uncomplicated predictions
17Moene (2007)
18Hibbs and Locking (2000)
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about the welfare consequences of unionsactions. By this he stated that
when more factors were included, unions did no longer necessarily have neg-
ative welfare implications.
Union wage setting models
Two workhorse models of union wage setting are used today, the right-to-
manage model19 and the e¢ ciency wage model. The type of union model is
relevant to the level of union wages.
The right-to-manage model is called so because after the union wage is
set, the rms are free to decide upon employment level.20 Within this model,
the union wage is determined based on negotiation between the rms and
the union. When the wage is set, rms choose employment level so that wage
equals marginal production of labour. The union typically obtain rents by
high union wages and by high employment within the union, two factors that
are negatively correlated. The rm achieves higher prots when wages are
lower. The wage is determined based on negotiations between the union and
the rms, and the outcome is a¤ected by how much power the parties have.21
A special case of a right-to-manage model, is the monopoly union model. In
this case, the rms have no power, and only union rents are maximized.
The outcome is a wage higher than in any other form of the right-to-manage
model.
The rigth-to-manage model is not e¢ cient. The union has more power
over wages than employment. When wages are driven up, this immediately
leads to lower employment. No contract between union and rm that species
both wage and employment is feasible.
In the e¢ ciency wage model, on the other hand, there are negotiations
on both wage and employment.22 The wage is set at the point of tangency
between the isoprot curve for the rm, and the indi¤erence curve for the
union. This produces a Pareto optimal union wage.23
19Andrews and Nickell (1983)
20Andrews and Nickell (1983)
21Manning (1987)
22Manning (1987)
23Oswald (1985), McDonald and Solow (1981)
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Insider outsider theory
Another element, which in principle can be combined with both these wage
setting models, is the insider outsider union theory.24 This theory is built
on the assumption that staying in a position within a union for a while
makes a worker an insider, and that replacing an insider with an outsider
gives the employer turnover costs. Thus, being an insider means being in
a position of power that can be used to achieve higher wage. We have a
situation where imperfect mobility of workers enables unionised workers to
exploit their position.
In ine¢ cient models, as the rigth-to-manage model, wages are driven up,
and employment su¤ers. With insider power, some workers can drive up
wages and benet from this, while other workers su¤er the unemployment
consequence of this.
Wage-drift
Deciding on union wages is not the same as controlling actual wages. When
wages are set nationally, there is room for rm level wage-changing behav-
iour. Wage-drift is increases in wages over the rates originally set in the
negotiations. Wage drift can be due to increases in overtime, or it can be
caused by employee-rm negotiations after the union rates are set. Wage
drift has for example been blamed for the wage explosion after the wage
freeze in Sweden.
1.1.2 Centralisation
The degree of unionisation is signicant for the implications of union wage
setting. Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) introduced the famous hump shape hy-
pothesis, the theory of the connection between real wages and centralisation.
Small unions will set moderate union wages, as market forces will restrain
them. As unions grow, their market power will increase, and so will union
wages. If unions are su¢ ciently large, the union interests typically coin-
cide with societys broader interests as the union organise almost the entire
workforce. Centralised unions will take into account how the nominal wages,
through the nominal price level, will inuence the real wages. Centralisation
tend moderate union wages.
24Lindbeck and Snower (2001)
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Degree of centralisation and wage di¤erentials
Moene and Wallerstein (1997) compares the e¤ect of centralised wage bar-
gaining with rm level bargaining. Evidence seems to indicate that a mod-
erate level of centralisation gives the highest unemployment, but which is
better of the two extremes? The answer relates to wage compression. Decen-
tralised wage bargaining gives rise to wage di¤erentials, while unionised wage
bargaining compresses wages. Decentralised wage bargaining causes workers
to demand higher wages after investments that raise marginal productivity
of labour have been made. This results in a string of events: fewer rms
will enter the market, and aggregate labour demand decline. Lower labour
demand will give lower wages outside the union, and if there is a minimum
wage, it will give higher unemployment. All this is avoided if centralised
unions determine the wage, and as long as unions take care not to set the
union wage too high, then unemployment may be unchanged.
Because of the di¤erent interpretations of centralised bargaining, it is
not an easy eld to explore. As pointed out by Calmfors (1993 p.182) "the
extent of centralisation is likely to have di¤erent e¤ects depending upon
whether it refers to sectors, profession, regions or uniosation" This being
said, Calmfors, and others with him agree that it seems to be a connection
between centralisation and smaller wage di¤erentials. Freedman and Nickell
(1988) go to the extent that they conclude that a small wage di¤erence is the
key indicator of level of centralisation.
1.1.3 Wage compression and growth
One of Rehns initial reason for wage compression was the argument that it
would rearrange labour to a more e¢ cient allocation, and retire less e¢ cient
rms. Both these aspects has been looked into, and theoretically, under
certain conditions wage compression can give higher economic growth.
Compressed wages and labour allocation
Agell and Lommerud (1993) point out that new technology typically comes
with a positive externality as production in innovative sectors generates fur-
ther progress. This, combined with sluggish labour mobility, due to pref-
erences towards the traditional sectors, causes too big a part of the labour
force to stay put in the traditional sector. Preferences towards the tradi-
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tional sector will make the wages there lower than the marginal product of
labour. The extra labour in the traditional sector will increase the marginal
product of capital, and ensures that too much of the capital stays put in
that sector as well. Agell and Lommerud argue that compressed wages will
force the traditional rms to hire less workers, as labour becomes more ex-
pensive, while innovative rms will hire more, as they experience cheaper
labour. The shift in labour towards the innovative sector will, if the new
wages are carefully determined, incorporate the positive externality. In this
manner, compressed wages have much the same e¤ect as a subsidy on inven-
tive sectors, implemented to make up for market imperfections created by an
externality.
An important aspect of growth created by wage compression is that the
wage level is moderate. Agell and Lommerud speculate that as moderate
wages can be di¢ cult to achieve, compressed wages will not always be a
possible growth inducing policy. The growth rate was high when solidaristic
wage setting was implemented in Norway and Sweden, a wage moderation
strategy then still implied rapidly rising wages.
Compressed wages and plant e¢ ciency
Moene and Wallerstein (1997) found similar results. Based on the argu-
mentation presented above, in which they concluded that centralisation was
superior to decentralisation in terms of unemployment, they also found that
centralisation promotes e¢ ciency. With bigger wage dispersion due to de-
centralised bargaining, old and less productive, plants can stay in business
longer. Production will sink, while employment is unchanged. Wage com-
pression through centralised bargaining induce old and less e¢ cient rms to
exit the industry quicker, which can keep aggregate production at a higher
level.
It should be mentioned, and was explicitly so by Agell and Lommerud
(1993), that even though wage compression may encourage growth in some
ways, the picture is complex. No general statement can be made even though
these two models demonstrate a connection.
Wage compression and welfare
A less enthusiastic view about the e¤ects of compressed wages was promoted
by Lindquist (2003). He argued that solidaristic wage setting will increase un-
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
employment amongst the low skilled workers. Lindquist bases his analysis of
the e¤ect of a monopoly union that compresses all wages, also between work-
ers that have di¤erent marginal product of labour. Lindbeck (1968) explicitly
expressed that this was not the intention with solidaristic wage bargaining.
Still, unions do tend to try to compress wages within the rms even though
this is not encouraged from an economic point of view.25 Lindquist nds that
wage compression decreases the number of high skilled labour. Though they
are not exactly the same, there is a similarity in the e¤ect of high skilled
labour and of innovation. In this respect, Lindquists ndings goes against
Agell and Lommeruds point, that compressed wages encourages more in-
novation. Thus, Lindquist illustrates that a specic set of factors must be
present for this to apply.
Lindquist found that the welfare loss from the unemployed low skill work-
ers is far greater than the gain from more human capital. The high unemploy-
ment among low skilled workers occurs because the wage is forced above their
level of marginal productivity. The lower education level occurs because the
returns to education sink. So not only does he nd that the e¤ect from wage
compression on welfare is negative, but he also reasons that more attention
should be turned towards how compressed wages a¤ect unemployment. In
conclusion Lindquist mentions that the heaviest burden from wage compres-
sion is carried by low skill workers. These welfare e¤ects were no doubt not
what Lindbeck and Aukrust had in mind, as compressed wages were meant
to give a more fair distribution of income.
1.1.4 Globalisation
Wage compression clearly interacts with trade openness. Will a compressed
wage distribution imply that the high skill or the low skill sector expand or
contracts, in the face of international competition? What is the implications
of some sectors being shielded from international competition while others
are not? Because trade is important, so are alterations in trade conditions,
and thus, globalisation. Implications of globalisation will inuence all parts of
the economy, also the ones not situated directly in the crossre. Davis (1998
p.409) puts it like this; Even when factor markets are strictly national, with
idiosyncratic institutional features, they cannot be considered in isolation
when goods markets are global.
25Hibbs and Locking (1996)
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Globalisation is a fact, not an instrument. We need to understand it in
order to adapt to it, but we can probably not control it without massive
e¢ ciency loss. Globalisation denes the environment, and alters the impli-
cations of policy. In order to adjust the policy in the most optimal way,
we need to understand what happens in the economy at di¤erent degrees of
globalisation.
Globalisation and output
First, without dwelling on them, specialisation and economies of scale should
be mentioned. Both possibilities arise under globalisation, and will give a
more e¢ cient way of producing. Costs will go down, and production will
increase. Aside from this, when markets are not perfectly competitive, as
they most realistically are not, globalisation can have more implications.
Imperfect competition means rms with prots. This will lead to a
phenomenon that Brander and Krügman (1983) named reciprocal dumping.
Reciprocal dumping arises when there is oligopolistic competition, and out-
put is sold in two or more separate markets. If a rm has monopolistic
power in one market, and sees an opportunity to sell in a additional, sepa-
rate, market, the rm will make the production decision for sale in the two
markets independently. The rm will exploit the opportunity to sell goods
in the foreign market because an increase of goods sold there have no inu-
ence on prices in the domestic market. If we assume two countries that have
monopoly power in one market each, both will ignore the fact that dumping
goods in the other market will be mirrored as the other country will dump
goods in the domestic market. As a result, total amount of goods in both
markets will increase, and prices will decrease. As long as trade costs are
su¢ ciently low, reciprocal dumping will increase consumer welfare because
is distorts market power.
When two countries are symmetrical, the dumping will be symmetrical.
If they have di¤erent production costs, reciprocal dumping can still persist,
but the country with the lower wages will account for most of the dumping.
After a threshold level of di¤erence in production costs, only one country will
do the dumping.
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Globalisation and union wages
A well-known theory of unionised wages under globalisation takes so-called
reciprocal dumping as its starting point. This means that rms both sells
at home and abroad, possibly at di¤erent prices. Naylor (1998) created a
partial equilibrium model with imperfect competition. According to Naylors
model, lower trade costs and thus higher degrees of globalisation, will increase
the extent of reciprocal dumping. Higher production will increase labour
demand, and the union wages will rise.
The argument above neglects the possibility of capital ight. Naturally,
if globalisation leads to higher wages, the incentives for o¤shoring or out-
sourcing may increase. Lommerud et al. (2003) formalised a model of FDI
that can shed some light on the relationship between globalisation, union
wages and capital ight. There are two countries. In the domestic market,
monopoly unions lead to high wages, whereas workers in the non-unionised
foreign country receive lower wages. The rm has three options: It can pro-
duce at home for one or both markets, it can do partial FDI and move the
production of the goods it wants to sell in the foreign market abroad, or
it can move the entire production capacity abroad. Given no FDI and low
trade costs, the domestic union keeps wages low to induce exports and high
employment. Further reductions in trade costs produces the Naylor e¤ect;
wages go up, and for the same reasons. With the assumption that unions can
not commit to low wages because investments are more long-term than the
determination of wages, this globalisation-induced wage increase will lead to
a larger incentive to do FDI. However, there may be a disadvantage related to
doing only partial FDI - it leads to a wage increase at home relative to the no
FDI option if trade costs are low. This is because under these circumstances,
unions are keeping wages low to induce exports, and the incentive for doing
so is totally erased once partial FDI is undertaken. For low trade costs and
low costs of FDI, therefore, the typical result is that the rm undertakes full
FDI, thus escaping the union inuence altogether. Lower levels of trade costs
can thus create capital ght that can be detrimental to unionised labour.
Friedman (1995) made a gloomy prediction that at some point in the
future, wages will be competed down to the same level as countries with far
lower living costs. Lommerud et al. argues that this prediction is probably
too negative. Trade will, because of the physical distances, never be com-
pletely costless. Thus, it is unlikely that more globalisation always creates
lower wages because of more competition amongst the workers. If the cost
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is high enough to keep some production in the domestic market, a marginal
change in trade costs can still increase union wages.
It is worth noting that in the model part of this thesis, the Naylor e¤ect
will surface, but capital ight is assumed not to be possible.
1.2 Practice
So how does these theories on unionisation, compressed wages and globali-
sation apply to the story of compressed wages in Norway and Sweden?
Let us rst look at centralisation. In addition to wage di¤erences that
were easier to defend from a socialistic point of view, common wage nego-
tiations in the open and the shielded sector means that the unions in the
two sectors will need to cooperate. The result is more centralised wage bar-
gaining, according to Calmfors and Dri¢ ll and this should have positive
implications in form of lower ination.
At rst glance, this does not t very well. Sweden struggled with ination
problems from the post war, and the problems persisted even after the wage
bargaining became highly centralised in the 1950s. One explanation could
be the same mechanics that caused the sudden jump in wages after the wage
freeze in Sweden; wage-drift. According to Hibbs and Locking (1996) this
was not the case. They found that wage drift seemed to be taken into account
when union wages were decided upon.
Moene (2007) expresses that in his view, the Rehn-Meidner agreement
was designed to gain control of the ination problems. The agreement be-
tween SAF and LO expressed their autonomous relationship to the govern-
ment. When employment is full, it is hard for the union to maintain mod-
erate wage growth, and at the same time maintain good spirits amongst
the workers. The Rehn-Meidner agreement included a number of Keynesian
government control measures that would ensure lower ination. Because the
period with compressed wages was also a period of economic growth and very
high employment, centralisation might actually have improved the situation
even though it did not completely mend the problem.
This brings us to the core of the interest in the Scandinavian model,
namely the subject of wage compression and growth. According to Meidner
(1993) at least part of the reason why solidaristic wage setting, and the
welfare state, is a success, is that the money spent is in fact an investment
in positive externalities. This is in accordance with Agell and Lommeruds
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theory. Further, as both the previous mention, and Moene and Wallerstein
claim, equal wages did lead to the demise of less productive rms.26
So, if the Scandinavian model worked according to the theory, as Meidner
(1993) so harshly put it: why did it fail? Hibbs and Locking blame the turn
towards equal pay for all.27 They suggested that the positive e¤ect from lower
inter industry wage dispersion was signicantly dampened when the policy
turned towards lower intra industry wage dispersion.28 The same e¤ects also
were at work under the decentralisation process, when both wage di¤erences
reversed, and thus, growth was not heavily a¤ected. This is in accordance
with Lindquists presentation of the ine¢ ciency of equal wages for di¤erent
levels of labour productivity. If this is what the centralisation promoted, it
will no longer be as attractive to join in the common negotiations.29
1.3 GOLE
We have now presented a fracture of the implications of solidaristic wage
setting. But one aspect seems to be missing in the material; an evaluation of
the e¤ect of solidaristic wage setting on aggregate welfare. The reason is that
until recently, no model has been designed in a way that made it possible to
consider the partial and the general equilibrium implications of solidaristic
wage setting, and the welfare e¤ects that goes with it. In order to clarify, we
need to take a de-tour.
Welfare is, at least in the stylised world of Economics, given by con-
sumption. The consumption bundle is determined by commodity prices and
income. When we are interested in what e¤ect solidaristic wage setting has
on welfare,30 we need to look at what it does to output prices, which again
are determined in coherence with production. In order to evaluate welfare
implications, we need to look at compressed wages and production. For us
to be able to assess what happens to production we want to have a model
26Olberg (2007, p. 19)
27Hibbs and Locking (1996)
28Hibbs and Locking (2000)
29Meidner (1993)
30The most obvious e¤ect is the direct e¤ect on the individual budgets, we will neatly
avoid this issue as we consider the aggregate welfare by looking at one representative
consumer. Even though there is no room for it in this thesis, our approach does allow for
looking at welfare implicationsfor the individual consumer.
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that is as realistic as possible and includes the most important factors in a
unionised, open economy.
Traditionally, there have been two main, but separate approaches to in-
ternational trade. One is comparative advantage and perfect competition,
the other is increasing returns and monopolistic competition.31
When we want to look at an economy that is characterised by unions,
market power is important. Without it, unions can not operate with union
wages that are higher than non-union wages. Consequently, a model based
on perfect competition is unusable to this purpose. This rules out the rst
approach.
The second approach, where monopolistic behavior is taken into account,
the common approach has been to assume one monopolist in each market,
thereby rule out the possibility of strategic behavior. This is an unrealistic
assumption, and thus, this approach is not satisfactory either.
What we need is a model where we can incorporate both strategic be-
haviour and general equilibrium. This is the missing link that Neary (2010)
addresses in the paper accurately named "Two and a half theories of trade".
Neary points to that the two dominating theories do give a number of in-
sights, and should not be underestimated, but in some respects they fall
short. Evaluating welfare implications of compressed wages is, for the rea-
sons presented above, an example of this.
At this point, we can go back to the issue of welfare and commodity prices,
and give a more intuitive explanation: Compressed wages will inuence good
prices in two ways. Directly, through changes in production due to di¤erent
production costs, and indirectly as changes in demand for goods in one sector,
this in turn will inuence allocation of purchases in all the other sectors. To
assess welfare, we need the results from the combined e¤ect.
Neary (2002) presented us with a tractable tool for this job: His model of
general oligopolistic equilibrium, or GOLE. By allowing for each rm to be
big in their market, but small in the economy, he combined strategic behav-
iour and a general equilibrium. The strategic behaviour allows oligopolistic
implications in small markets, thus the model can encompass the oligopolis-
tic phenomenon reciprocal dumping. In addition, the general equilibrium is
a¤ected by the strategic behaviour of the rms, but as each individual rm
is assumed to be innitesimal, they will ignore this in their decisions.
Neary has demonstrated a number of arenas to use GOLE. Within the
31Neary (2003a)
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frames of this model, numerous extensions can be made. We will make use of
two of these, both divides the economy into di¤erent sectors. Neary opened
up for applying di¤erent traits to di¤erent parts of the market, and, most
important to us, he demonstrated how this would play out in when there is a
possibility of trade.32 In this case the imperfect market makes trade protable
(between two identical countries) even though a trade costs give the export-
ing country a disadvantage. Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) presented an
extension that allowed for unions, and demonstrated the di¤erences between
a shielded and an open economy with unions. Unionised general oligopolis-
tic equilibrium, or UGOLE was born. The particular setup of the UGOLE
model we will use is developed by Kreickemeier and Meland (2011); both
shielded and open sector with separate unions, all in one economy. All the
results derived in this thesis, before implementing solidaristic wage setting,
are the same results they found.
This model incorporates all the main factors in an economy that we are
interested in when looking at welfare implications of solidaristic wage setting,
which is the main mission in this thesis. But, as mentioned, the model also
opens up to the possibility of achieving insights on another important area,
namely how compressed wages inuence the implications of globalisation.
Kreickemeier and Meland (2011) gave a review of globalisation in the version
of UGOLE that they generated, and in this thesis we will compare some of
their results to the results derived under compressed wages.
1.4 Structure
Now that we have taken a glance on the eld, we can narrow it down again.
In this thesis will look on solidaristic wage setting, and the implications it
has on welfare and globalisation. We will use a monopoly union model, with
two types of unions, one in the shielded sector and one in the open. To
implement solidaristic union wages in UGOLE, we will see what happens if
both union types promote the same wage. Because of this we will, from now
on, call solidaristic wage setting union wage equalisation. The results given
in the model without union wage equalisation, will be denoted Kreickemeier-
Meland results. All mentioning of union wages before we explicitly introduce
union wage equalisation and UGOLE combined, (in the end of section 3),
32Neary (2003b, 2009), Eckel and Neary (2010)
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are Kreickemeier-Meland wages. Before we derive the general equilibrium,
all discussion will be concerning partial equilibrium results.
We start, in section 2, by presenting the model using all the assumptions
presented by Kreickemeier and Meland (2010). Then, in section 3 we derive
the partial equilibrium. We nd the optimal output levels, and wages under
the assumption that the competitive wage is xed. We also nd the levels of
trade cost under which trade will take place. In section 4 we derive the general
equilibrium, and at this point we can implement union wage equalisation. We
will derive two states, the Kreickemeier-Meland equilibrium, and the union
wage equalisation equilibrium. We will then look at the di¤erence in the
wages in the two models. In section 5 we insert all our obtained information
into the utility functions, and assess what happens to welfare under union
wage equalisation compared to Kreickemeier and Melands model. In section
6 we look at implications of globalisation in both equilibriums. In section 7
we will discuss some of the main objection to combining wage compression
and UGOLE, and nally, in section 8, we will present our concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
The Model
To be able to look at the implications of union wage equalisation, we need
a framework where the market is divided into parts that are shielded from
outside competition, and parts that are exposed to outside competition. We
also need to allow for unions. For union wages to exceed market wages,
we need market power. To evaluate welfare we need to be able to look at
general equilibrium implications of wage alterations. We have argued why
Peter Nearys model of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium fulls all these
criteria, and that the Kreickemeier-Meland version has all the features we
need to apply this model to the topic of solidaristic wage setting.
The key factor to GOLE, is that it can encompass both partial equilibria
in small markets with oligopolistic competition and a general equilibrium in
the economy as a whole. The implications of these model characteristics,
are that the rm assumes no inuence on factor prices. Neary pointed out
that while economists acknowledge the lack of perfect competition, there is
an absence of models that take into account both the facts that rm view
factor prices to be xed, and that, due to macro level e¤ects, they are in fact
not. Neary remarks that
Models of industrial organization typically take factor prices and aggre-
gate income as given, and pay little attention to interactions between mar-
kets. General-equilibrium models of monopolistic competition typically ignore
strategic behaviour by incumbents, and assume a perfectly elastic supply of
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Neary addressed this problem by creating a model where each rm pro-
duces goods in a market with a limited number of rms. In this market, the
output level is determined by oligopolistic competition, where each rm takes
the output produced by the other rms as given according to Cournot com-
petition. Output in this market will be lower than the perfect competition
level, and prices will be higher.
To make each rm conceive factor prices as exogenous, all markets need
to be small enough to be negligible in the economy. This is accomplished
by dening the economy as continuum of oligopolistic markets. We assume
that labour is the only factor of production, and that there is no unemploy-
ment. Lower demand will decrease the wage rather than push workers out
of the market; hence, the equilibrium factor price outside the unions, is the
competitive wage that clears the labour market.
Changes that inuence demand for labour in the unionised sectors will
cause a reallocation of workers, and this will lead to changes in the wages in
the non-unionised sectors. If the union wages increases, the excess workers
will be pushed into the non-union sectors. Likewise, if the union wages
decrease, the extra workers demanded will be drawn from the non-union
sectors. This will result in a change in the market clearing wage.2
In the continuum of markets, each market is denoted z, where 0 < z < 1.
Every market has a limited number of producers, denoted n, and 1 < n <
1. The degree of market power is given by the number of rms in each
sector. As n goes to innity, production increases until it reaches the perfectly
competitive level. This is an unlikely scenario, and the model will be more
interesting when n is relatively small.
We divide the markets into four di¤erent sectors. Firstly we assume
one part that produces tradable goods, and one that produces non-tradable
goods, these will be referred to as respectively open and shielded sectors.
The portion of the economy that is open is dened by , and the portion
that is shielded is 1   , where 0 <  < 1. Further, we assume that part
of both open and shielded sectors are unionised, and to the same degree, ,
where 0 <  < 1.3
To look at the implications of trade we look at an economy consisting of
2This happens because we assume no unemployment. If we had allowed for unemploy-
ment, and had a lower limit to the competitive wage, (either minimum wage or reservation
wage), demand changes would create changes in unemployment.
3Realistically, it is seldom the case that open and shielded sector has the same union
density, this is an assumption made to simplify the model.
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two countries, one domestic and one foreign. To simplify, we assume that
the two countries are perfectly symmetric.
The economy will be sectioned like this:4
(2.1)
In the two unionised sectors, the unions set the wage by maximising a
union rent function. There is one union in each market in the unionised
sectors, and unions within each dened sectors act identically. This is a
monopoly union model, and the unions single-handedly decide the wage. The
rms represented by the unions hire workers so that marginal income from
labour equals this wage. This way, the union indirectly controls employment
through wage setting.
The unions are interested in high employment and high wages in their
markets. Wages are rstly decided in the unionised sectors. Then rms in
the unionised sectors choose employment given the union wage. The rest of
the workers end up in the competitive sectors. Because we have assumed
that all workers are employed, the competitive wage will be the wage that
ensures this. The Cournot game is solved by backward induction.
2.0.1 Partial and general equilibrium e¤ects
There are two di¤erent mechanisms that will induce changes in wages and
production. They have been mentioned, but a more thorough denition is in
order. The rst one is the partial equilibrium e¤ect, or more intuitively, the
direct e¤ect. This is how changes in e.g. trade cost directly a¤ect the optimal
decision for rms and unions through changing the costs. The second e¤ect
is the general equilibrium e¤ect, this is more of an indirect e¤ect. When a
factor in the economy changes, this will lead to adjustments in all sectors.
4Illustration from Kreickemeier and Meland (2011)
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These adjustments will rearrange labour, and in the last instance, impose
changes in the wage in non-unionised sectors. Production and wages in all
sectors depend on the competitive wage, and will be indirectly a¤ected. The
direction of this e¤ect is, contrary to partial equilibrium e¤ects, inuenced by
the relative sizes of the sectors. General equilibrium e¤ects can also originate
from changes in sector sizes.
An intuitive insight that might come in handy later on is the di¤erence in
how wages are determined in the unionised versus the non-unionised sectors.
In the unionised sector, the wage is decided based on a balance between the
wage level and the employment level. When the unions are satised, the left
overworkers will end up in the non-unionised sectors, and the amount of
workers here will determine the competitive wage.
2.1 Preferences
Individual utility is a function of the continuum of goods consumed. Neary
(2002) argues that a quadratic utility function is the most convenient one,
because it assures a demand curve that is conceived to be linear by producers.
Models with linear demand are easy to solve in partial equilibrium, and one
avoids problems with non-monotonic reaction functions.
The utility function is
u (z) = ax (z)  1
2





This is a version of utility in Gorman polar form. When we assume this
form, we can treat the aggregated utility as if it were the utility of one
single, representative individual.
x(z) indicates the amount of good z consumed by a representative indi-
vidual. The amount of goods consumed will vary from market to market as
prices will di¤er across the sectors. u (z) represents the utility gained from
consumption in market z. Marginal utility declines with consumption.5 The
5A quadratic function has the trait that it decreases after maximum. Using this kind
of function to illustrate utility implies that after the maximum, marginal utility decreases
per extra unit consumed. We must ensure that the consumption level derived in the model
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aggregate utility U is determined by taking the integral of utility across all
markets of the economy.
The maximal amount of goods consumed is given by the budget con-
straint. We assume no saving, thus income I must equal price multiplied by




(p (z)x (z)) dz: (2.3)
To nd the optimal level of consumption in each market, we use the
Lagrangian method, and from this we nd the inverse demand function and





















where  is the integral of prices, and thus represents the price level. 2 is the








(p (z))2 dz: (2.7)
is realistic in the respect that it always gives the individual positive marginal utility. This











This is guaranteed as no market will exist as long as the price is negative, and because
marginal utility of income can never be negative.
6The utility function is concave in x (z), and the budget restraint is linear in x (z). We
can use the rule that the sum of a concave and a linear expression yield a concave function,
therefore we know we have found a maximum.
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To be more technically precise,  is the rst moment of prices. It repre-
sents the aggregate price level in the economy, and portrays somewhat the
same as, and acts like, the average price.  provides information on changes
in the price level in the economy when factors change in the model, and en-
ables us to evaluate the e¤ect of higher or lower price level. The marginal
utility of income depends positively on the price level. Higher price level
gives lower utility, and thus higher marginal utility.
This is because the marginal utility of income decreases when utility
increases. Because higher price level makes the consumer worse o¤, marginal
utility increases.
Correspondingly, 2 is the second moment of prices, and may be used as
a parameter for the variance in prices. Neary (2002), quite accurately, calls
this the un-centered variance of prices. Two di¤erent changes in the economy
will cause 2 to change. Because it is indeed un-centered, higher prices will
create a higher 2. Further, because the price is squared, larger di¤erence
in prices across the market will cause 2 to rise. As we will demonstrate,
we can derive a simple expression that represents the price level. This will
come in handy as it gives us the opportunity to lter out the pure e¤ect of
a change in the variance of prices. The marginal utility of income depends
negatively on the un-centered variance of prices because price variance makes
the consumer better o¤, and decreases the extra utility obtained by the last
income spent. As will become apparent, the un-centered variance of prices
is the key factor to consumer utility in this model.
From the consumerspoint of view,  represents the general equilibrium
e¤ect from prices all the other sectors on consumption in the last sector.
If prices increase in all markets but one, the consumer would still adjust
consumption in the last market. This happens because a bigger portion of
the income would be spent in the other markets.  is positive, so a Ib > 0.
This all adds up to a demand function, (2:4), that increases with a, and
decreases with b, x (z) and . As each producer in the economy is big in their
market, they will be able to inuence prices via production. As we dened
them to be small in the economy, we have assumed that they perceive to
have no inuence on I,  or 2. Therefore, the rms will perceive  to be
xed, and product demand as linear.
Because demand always depends on what happens in the other markets,
all prices and wages will depend on : As long as we are operating within
partial equilibrium, where  is treated as an exogenous parameter, we will
not discuss the implications of this.
2.2. INDIRECT UTILITY 25
2.2 Indirect utility
The indirect utility function that we are about to derive, plays a central
part in this thesis. It provides us with a seemingly simple measure of con-
sumer welfare, however the mechanics behind it are complex, and we will now
present them thoroughly. Before doing this, one thing should be pointed out.
Welfare depends on income, and in this model, income is, even though we
do not explore it, an endogenous variable. When we look at the utility of
a representative individual, we look at the aggregate welfare. Implementing
union wage equalisation means lower income to some consumers, and higher
income to some. This means that the direction of the welfare e¤ect on the
representative individual does not necessarily reect the welfare e¤ect on the
individual.
From the utility function (2:2), we can derive the indirect utility by sub-






Utility depends negatively on marginal utility of income, again this is











At this point, we have obtained two expressions for the indirect utility.
(2:8) depends on a product of two endogenous variables, 22, and (2:9)
depends on three separate endogenous variables, , I and 2: Later on, we will
use 22 to evaluate the welfare e¤ect of union wage equalisation, therefore,
we need to consider the relationship between welfare and the un-centered
variance of prices.
Firstly we derive the di¤erence in utility solely brought forward by a
change in the un-centered price variance, from (2:8) ; ignoring @
@2
. We nd
that by considering only this aspect of welfare change when prices change,
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But prices are not the only factor changed by union wage equalisation; as
prices change, the marginal utility of income, ; will be a¤ected. By looking
at (2:9), and by deriving the e¤ect of a change in 2 in this expression we










This important point, that the e¤ect of higher price variance on welfare
changes direction when d
d2
is ignored, was identied by Kreickemeier and
Meland (2011). Though the theoretical model functions perfectly without
looking into this aspect, the bit that relates to intuitive understanding is lost
when  is not taken into account.
There are several reasons for the seemingly opposite e¤ects from a change
in the un-centered price variance. 2 a¤ects utility through two di¤erent
channels, directly, and through the marginal utility of income.
Let us consider the e¤ect when the marginal utility of income is assumed
to be una¤ected, as shown in (2:8). When marginal utility of income is con-
stant, the consumer must have the same marginal utility of income after the
increase in 2; therefore, the increase must be compensated by a correspond-
ing increase in (a  bI)2. Ignoring @
@2
means ignoring the e¤ect from all of




(a  Ib) = 2:
Thus, the e¤ect of an increase in the price variance is accompanied by
lower purchasing power.7 Because 2 is un-centered, the increase can be
interpreted as an increase of price level, as an increase in variance of prices,
or both of the above. The overall result is lower welfare, but we can not
know what caused this.
~
U enables us to lter out the pure e¤ect of a bigger price variance. This
expression contains the rst moment of prices. When (a  Ib) is constant
and we can be sure that the increase in 2 is due to more di¤erentiated prices
in the sectors, the increase will lead to an increase if welfare. Kreickemeier
7Since we have assumed that a > bI, we have ruled out that (a  bI)2 will decrease
when  decreases.
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and Meland (2011) explain the opposite reactions to a change in the price
variance with the fact that (2:9) incorporates general equilibrium e¤ects,
while (2:8) portrays partial equilibrium e¤ects.
 and  determine the size of each sector, and the strength of the e¤ect
from a price change in one sector will be determined by the size of the sector.
For instance, if for some reason the output price falls in the open, unionised
sector, and stays put in all others,  will be e¤ected more if  is large.
Even though (2:9) gives the most accurate description of welfare, (2:8)
is mathematically tractable as well. As (2:8) contains fewer endogenous
parameters, this is more practical to handle, and will hence forth be the
used when evaluating utility.
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Chapter 3
Partial equilibrium
The partial equilibrium in UGOLE, produces the same results as Naylors
previously mentioned model. When ignoring general equilibrium e¤ects, the
two models are built on the same assumptions. In UGOLE, because each rm
is small in the economy, we have dened them to consider the competitive
wage to be xed. The rms will optimise production based on output in their
sector. Since each rm is innitely small in the economy, they will treat the
competitive wage parametrically, and assume no inuence on prices in the
other sectors. Thereby, they also assume no inuence on marginal utility of
income, and will believe demand to be linear. In the Naylor model linear
demand is an assumption.
The prot,  is maximised based on a Cournot-model. The rms consider
the competitors production as given, and optimise production based on the
prices of goods and production costs. We assume identical rms in the respect
that they have identical production functions. They will all take into account
that a marginal increase in production lowers output price, and consequently
also prots from all units sold. The result is a market with less production,
and therefore higher prices, than in a perfectly competitive market.
Unions will predict the rm decisions, and use this information when
deciding the union wage. The unions care about two aspects, they want
their members to have a high wage compared to the market wage, and they
want their sector to have numerous employees. One way of portraying this,
which will be used throughout this model, is

 = (wu   wc)`(z): (3.1)
When optimising union rents, the unions have to take into account that as
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wages increase, the rms in the sector will hire fewer workers. The union will
never allow for negative union rents, so the union wage will always exceed,
or in extreme cases be equal to, the competitive wage. Unionised rms will
have production costs given by the union wages, and rms in the competi-
tive sectors will have production costs equal the market clearing competitive
wage. This will lead to di¤erent levels of production between the unionised
and the non-unionised sections of both the open and the shielded part of the
economy.
The di¤erence between the shielded and the open sector is, naturally,
that while rms in shielded sector take into account only the actions of the
other producers in the sector, rms in the open sector also interact with
the open sector in the foreign country. In addition, the open sector faces a
trade cost, t, on exports. We will use trade costs as the only indication of
degree of globalisation. Another way to go about it is to evaluate degree of
openness, measured by the size of the open sector.1 This is also relevant to
union wage equalisation, as the degree of openness was an important factor
in implementing it. Going into this is a big project, and we will save it for
another time.
An implication of considering level of trade cost to be the degree of glob-
alisation, and designating trade costs to be the only factor that determines
the degree of globalisation, is that we also assume that there are no other
factors, such as politics or consumer preferences, to inuence trade.
We will denote goods sold in the home sector y1, and goods exported y2.
Foreign quanta will go by the same notation, but will be denoted with an
additional asterisk.
Marginal productivity of labour is set to unity, this implies that wage
equals marginal cost of production. It also implies that quantity produced
by one rm, equals the number of workers hired in this rm yi (z) = li (z).
Unions will secure their members a wage that exceeds the competitive wage,





















+ (1  ) 
1
(3.2)
The superscript u denotes unionised wage and superscript c denotes com-
1See Kreickemeier and Meland (2010)
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petitive wage. Subscript s indicates shielded sector and subscript t indicates
open sector. Corresponding notation will be used on all components that
take di¤erent value in the di¤erent sectors.
Shielded sector
Firm prots are given by earnings from each output sold multiplied by quan-
tity produced. All goods produced are sold in the domestic market. The
production level is the level that maximises
i (z) = (p (z)  c (z)) yi (z) :
Each additional unit sold on the market will cause the price of the product
to fall. We nd that production is optimal when marginal change in revenue
from the last unit produced, equals prot per unit:2
  dp (z)
dyi (z)
yi (z) = p (z)  c (z) :
Production as a function of production costs is derived by substituting for
price from (2:4). We assume that there is no surplus production or demand,
and aggregate consumption equals total production in the sector. To nd
the e¤ect of this rms additional production on price, we need to derive it
from the price given the total production in the economy. To achieve this we
substitute by
Pn
i=1 yi (z) for x (z) in the inverse demand function. All rms
are identical, so that in equilibrium,
Pn
i=1 yi (z) = ny (z). To attain the
optimal production per rm in the shielded sector we substitute
Pn
i=1 yi (z)
for ny (z) and nd
ys (z) =
a  c (z)
b (1 + n)
: (3.3)
As the number of rms increases, the rms will predict a higher aggre-
gate production, recognise that this means a lower market price, and the
production of each rm decreases. The di¤erence between production in the
unionised and non-unionised sector will be determined by the di¤erence in
production costs.
2The second order conditions conrm that we have a maximum.
32 CHAPTER 3. PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
Shielded, unionised sector When we are looking at one specic sector,
like we are here, all prices and production levels are determined thereafter.
At this point we can exclude z from the equations, and insert for the sector-
specic levels of cost and production. Whenever we go back to discussing
components that are not sector-specic, we will use z to emphasize this.
The total employment in the sector equals the total output, lus = ny
u
s .




s   wc)nyus :
Substituting for production, (3:3) ; into the union rent function with pro-
duction cost wus , and maximising the union utility yields the optimal union




(a+ wc) : (3.4)
Through the wage level, the union regulates the production in the sector.
By imposing a union wage on the rm that is higher than the competitive
wage, production in the sector falls.
Open sector
Producers in the open sector must nd both the optimal amount to sell in
the domestic market, and the optimal export level. Even if there were no
trade cost, the rms would behave as if there were two separate markets,
but, because of reciprocal dumping, their output level would increase.
The rms that produce tradable goods have two separate markets where
they can obtain prots, the domestic and the foreign. In both markets, the
price is inuenced by foreign production. Prots equal
i = (p (z)  c (z)) y1i (z) + (p (z)  c (z)  t) y2i (z) :
In the same manner as in shielded sector, the marginal revenue obtained
by the last output sold must equal the prots obtained from the last output
sold. In the open sector, this must apply separately both to the marginal
product sold in the domestic market, and to the marginal product exported.
3The second order condition conrm that we have a maximum.
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= p (z)  c (z)




= p (z)  c (z)  t:4
We can see that the rm will make separate production decisions in the
two markets. Exports are more costly because of the trade cost, and when
foreign prices equal domestic prices, the level of exports will be the lower
of the two. By the same principle as in the shielded sector, but now with






2i in the domestic, inverse
demand function(2:4) to derive the e¤ect of a marginal change in produc-
tion. Similarly we insert for x (z) = n (y1 (z) + y2 (z)) before solving for the
optimal level of domestic production.
The foreign inverse demand is equivalent to domestic inverse demand.
Likewise, the procedure to obtain the optimal exports is equivalent to obtain-
ing optimal domestic production. Optimal domestic production and export















From these equations, we can observe how foreign competition inuence
domestic production. Foreign export, y2 (z), is import in the domestic mar-
ket. Production in the domestic market, y1i (z), decrease as import increases.
More imports will still lead to an increase in the total amount of goods in








4Because the markets are separate, so are the optimalisation problems. The second
order conditions conrm that we have maximums in both cases.
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The increase of total amount of goods is caused by reciprocal dumping.
By using the assumption of symmetry, we can insert the foreign equivalents
of y1 and y2. We now have the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of goods sold at
home, and exports.
y1i (z) =




a+  (nc (z)  (c (z) + t) (n+ 1))
(2n+ 1) b
:
At this point we can nd the aggregate production in rms in the open
sector.
yt (z) = y1i (z) + y2i (z) =
2a  t  2c (z) (n+ 1) + 2nc (z)
(2n+ 1) b
: (3.7)
Lower trade costs a¤ect production to the domestic market negatively,
because imports increase. It naturally increases exports as the cost goes
down. Lower production costs leads to an increase both in exports, and in
domestic sale.
Open, unionised sector
Open sector unions nd their optimal union wage using the same routine as
in the shielded sector, but now total employment is determined by production
both in the domestic market and exports, lut = ny
u
t : The union rent function,
(3:1) becomes

t =  (w
u
t   wc)nyut :
By inserting for (3:7), setting c (z) = wut and c
 (z) = wut , and optimis-
ing,5 we derive
wut =
2a+ 2nwut + 2w
c (1 + n)  t
4 (1 + n)
: (3.8)
After the union in the open sector has found the optimal wage based
on the foreign union wage, we can use the assumption of symmetry. When
5The second order conditions conrm that we have a maximum.
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wut = w
u
t , the optimal union wage becomes
wut =
2a+ 2wc (n+ 1)  t
2 (n+ 2)
: (3.9)
We see in (3:9) the same pattern as we can see concerning production in
the open sector; trade costs have a smaller e¤ect on the wage than the other









From (3:10), it is evident that globalisation increases the union wage in
the open sector through partial equilibrium e¤ects (i.e. if we assume that 
and wc are exogenously given). Lower trade costs will make production in
this sector increase, and thus labour demand will increase. The union will
nd it optimal to trade some of the additional employment for higher wages.
It achieves more union rents when the marginal utility from increased wage
equals marginal utility from increased employment. The result that wages
increase when trade costs decrease is, as mentioned, identical to the results
in Naylors partial equilibrium model.
Symmetrical countries is a strong and unrealistic assumption, but it
makes the model easily solvable. In addition, it provides us with information
in the extreme case when trade occurs only because of imperfect competition
in the markets. If we were to loosen this assumption, it would, to some ex-
tent be possible to predict in what direction trade would be a¤ected. Neary
(2003b) explores some implications of unsymmetrical countries in GOLE.
3.1 Comparison, wages
We have already justied union wage equalisation on the grounds that the
union wage will be higher in the shielded sector. We have derived both
wages, and now we can check if this is true in this model. Before doing
this, one matter must be taken care of. The union wage in the opens sector
depends on trade costs, while the union wage in the shielded sector does
not. To be able to compare the two, we need to get rid of this parameter. As
mentioned, globalisation causes the union wage in the open sector to rise. We
are interested in looking at the di¤erence caused by trade, not by additional
costs in the shielded sector, so we assume the highest possible wage in open
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sector, which occur when t = 0. Comparing the two union wages under these
conditions, wus and w
u
t jt=0, we nd that the di¤erence is




We know that a  wc > 0, otherwise there would be no production, see
(3:3) : The union wage in the shielded sector is higher than the union wage
in the open sector when trade costs are zero. This implies that union wages
in the shielded sector will always be higher, and the gap will increase when
the trade cost increase.
The lower union wage in the open sector is the result of the additional
competition that comes with trade. In the open sector twice as many rms
operate in the market.
The di¤erence in production levels in the shielded sector, (3:7), and the
open sectors, (3:3), is:6
yct   ycs =
a  wc   t (1 + n)
b (2n+ 1) (1 + n)
: (3.12)
When comparing the production in the two sectors, we nd that there will
be more production in the open sector when t is small. From (3:3) and, (3:5)
we can see that if t reaches the level where there is no export, production
in the open sector will be equal to production in the shielded sector.7 Thus,
production can only either be equal or bigger in the open sector. This is
along the lines of Brander and Krugmans theory of reciprocal dumping.
3.2 Threshold levels of trade costs
Even though we have dened one part of the market as open, the decision on
whether to trade or not, lies in the hands of the rms. Of course, the unions
have a nger in the pie, as they set the wage.
Huizinga (1993) was one of the rst to look into output market integra-
tion, and union wages. His ndings were important because he suggested
that trade might be more benecial than what had traditionally been as-
sumed. He demonstrated how, in a shielded monopoly market with unions
6In order to look at the di¤erence due to trade, not di¤erent production costs, we look
at production in the two competetive sectors.
7Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009)
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present, opening up to trade can benet both unions and rms. Huizinga
uses a case where the initial situation is one of monopoly, but the results
may easily be translated to a situation with oligopoly. A couple of traits has
to be present for this to apply. Firstly, the competition between rms must
be Cournot style, and demand must be linear. The theory is that when the
open sector in two identical countries starts to export, the quantum of out-
put in both domestic markets will increase. He assumes no trade costs. Each
rm will recognise that their own inuence on the output price is smaller,
and will produce more than when there was no export. Huizinga found that
under trade, production increases and prices decreases, this is in line with
the theory of reciprocal dumping. In addition, he found that union wage
decreases. Huizingas principle can be recognised in UGOLE model from
the di¤erence between union wage and production in the shielded, unionised
sector, and in the open, unionised sector. See (3:11) and (3:12). According
to Huizinga these positive results arises because the initial equilibrium orig-
inates in monopoly market, and thus is ine¢ cient, while under trade, there
are more competing rms in the market. The ndings by Huizinga that is
most relevant to us, is that engaging in trade will lead to lower union wages,
and increased union rent.8
In our model, Huizingas result does not always apply. He assumes no
trade costs, while in our model, increasing trade costs will gradually devour
the union rents.
We have demonstrated how the unions set the wage in the open sector,
and what this wage is. But, when we derived the wage, we implicitly assumed
that the unions want and are able to induce the rms to engage in trade.
There is indeed a pure strategy wage game equilibrium where this is the
case, but it only exists for low trade costs. Because of this, we need to put
restrictions on t. Finding the threshold level of trade costs is an untidy
a¤air, and will be left in the appendix together with the intuition behind it.
The procedure we have followed is the one used by Bastos and Kreickemeier
(2009) (See A.2.1) The threshold level is
t = 4
(a  wc) (n+ 1)









For any trade cost level below this, unions set low wages that will make rms
export. Under this level, if the trade cost decrease, the unions will consider
8given no trade costs.
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this as a cut in production costs and rise the union wage.
There exists a second threshold level of trade costs. This is the level
where it is not protable to trade when production costs are given by the
competitive wage (i.e. the lowest possible level of union wage in the open
sector). This level is easier to nd. This is simply the level of trade cost






The relationship between the two threshold levels of trade cost is deter-
mined by the higher wages faced by the rms within the union. But for the
sake of clarity:
t < t:
As mentioned, we will operate with a economy where we assume that
t < t, where it is possible to determine an equilibrium. The threshold
level t, is still useful because this expression is more orderly than the
threshold level, t. This will come in handy because it can provide answers
that will apply for this level of trade cost, and all levels of trade cost below
this level. If something applies when trade costs are su¢ ciently low, it is
adequate to a general statement that it applies when t = t.
Union wages, due to partial equilibrium e¤ects, decline in t until it
reaches t: The competitive wage is a¤ected through general equilibrium
e¤ects, has a more complex relationship to t. After deriving the general
equilibrium, and nding the competitive wages we will demonstrate that in
the Kreickemeier-Meland model, globalisation will always lead to an increase
in competitive wage, but under union wage equalisation, there are cases where
globalisation leads to a decrease in the competitive wage.
3.3 Union wage equalisation and UGOLE com-
bined
We have now come to the point where we can merge UGOLE and union wage
equalisation. The principle in union wage equalisation is to make the wage
di¤erences smaller across the sectors. One can not force the lowest wage,
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namely the competitive wage, to be higher without causing unemployment.
However, the union wages may be tampered with.
We have shown that the union wage in the shielded sector is higher than
the union wage in the open sector. By imposing open sector union wage in
the shielded, unionised sector, we achieve a solidaristic union wage structure.
This change will also lead to a set of adjustments in production that will
a¤ect the competitive wage. When the union in the shielded sector have to
o¤er their members a lower union wage in the open sector, production in
the shielded, unionised sector will increase. The union in the shielded sector
will nd themselves receiving lower union rents, as they would prefer higher
wage and lower employment. The union in the open sector will be indi¤erent
as far as partial equilibrium e¤ects go, but more production in the shielded
unionised sector will initiate general equilibrium e¤ects. We will soon look
into what alterations these result in.
We have implied that the elevated union wages are made possible by the
market power in the market fragments, and that the market power is weaker
in the open sector because the number of rms is doubled. As long as the
higher union wage in the closed sector is caused by monopolistic power, this
alone may be a argument for interference.
Now that we have derived the wages in both sectors, we will use these,
rather than just general production costs, to evaluate production. But, as the
competitive wage will be di¤erent with and without union wage equalisation,
we can not compare the two scenarios yet.
As a result of collapsing the union wages, we get an economy with only two
di¤erent wages, one in the unions, and one outside the unions. All volumes
unique to union wage equalisation will be denoted by an E. Whereas before,
when the union in the shielded sector were allowed to choose its own preferred
wage, and the sector wages were in accordance with (3:2), the economy now







0  z  




+ (1  ) 
< z 
< z 
+ (1  ) 
1
3.3.1 Production levels in the two regimes
The production levels in the sectors are found by inserting the wages into
the production function belonging to the corresponding sector. Changing
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the wage in shielded, unionised sector will change production. By inserting
successively (3:4) ; (3:9), wc and wcE into (3:3) and (3:7), we eventually get
expressions for production in all sectors:
Production Kreickemeier-Meland output
Union, open yut =
(2a t 2wc)(n+1)
(2n+1)(n+2)b
Non-union, open yct =
2a t 2wc
(2n+1)b
Union shielded yus =
a wc
2b(n+1)




Union wage equalisation output
Union, open yutE =
(2a Et 2EwcE)(n+1)
(2n+1)(n+2)b
Non-union, open yctE =
2a Et 2EwcE
(2n+1)b
Union shielded yusE =
2a(n+1)+Et 2EwcE(n+1)
2(n+2)(n+1)b
Non-union, shielded ycsE =
a wcE
b(1+n)
Preliminary, only production in shielded, unionised sector appears to have
changed, but keep in mind that the competitive wage and  will be di¤erent
under union wage equalisation.
Relative production
Aside from di¤erent competitive wages with and without union wage equal-
isation, the only signicant di¤erence in production occurs in the unionised,
shielded sector. Naturally, as wages are higher in the two unions, production
will be lower there compared to the non-unionised parts.
In the open sectors, the relative relationship between production in the
unionised and the non-unionised sector will stay constant, no matter what










In the shielded sector without in the Kreickemeier-Meland model, the
relationship between production in unionised and non-unionised sectors is
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The relative production does not depend on the number of rms in the
sector, and there will always be produced twice the amount in the non-
unionised sector compared to the unionised sector.




Et+ 2 (n+ 1) (a  EwcE)
2 (n+ 2) (a  EwcE)
:
By forcing the union in the shielded sector to use the wage optimised
by the union in the open sector, the relationship between the unionised and
the non-unionised sectors in the open sector becomes more complex. This
is because the union wage, unlike in the Kreickemeier-Meland case, now
depends on both number of rms in the market, and level of trade costs. We
nd that when only looking at partial equilibrium e¤ects, globalisation will
increase production in rms in the unionised sector compared to rms in the
non-unionised sector. As there originally is less production in the shielded













When trade costs are zero, the relationship becomes like the relationship
between the unionised and non-unionised sectors in the open part of the
economy. Union wage equalisation manages to some extent to internalise
the e¤ect of globalisation in the shielded sector. This is done by making the
shielded union react on the globalisation by increasing wage. The result is
an echo of the e¤ect of reciprocal dumping in the shielded sector.
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Chapter 4
General equilibrium
The partial equilibrium gave us the production and wages in each market
of the economy. Because we have calculated the production in the di¤erent
sectors, we can now move from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium.
The general equilibrium in UGOLE is found when we consider each partial
market as a segment in the continuum that constitutes the economy.
With no unemployment, general equilibrium must be the state where the
aggregate labour force (L) equals labour demand across all sectors. We have








(y1 (z) + y2 (z)) dz;
where y2 (z) = 0 in the shielded sectors.
As mentioned, there is a di¤erence in how workers end up in the unionised
versus the competitive sectors. Unions will always o¤er wages higher than
the competitive wage, and will therefore have the opportunity to choose
any number of workers. When rms in the unionised sectors have all the
workers they wish for in accordance with their optimisation problem, the
rest of the workers are distributed in the two sectors with competitive wages.
The amount of workers in each of these two sectors is determined by trade
costs and by the degree of export. The competitive wage takes on the level
that enables the rms in the competitive sectors to hire all workers that
are pushed out from the unionised sectors. In this manner the competitive
43
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wage is a product of all the other factors of the economy, thereof the general
equilibrium e¤ect. As costs in all the part of the economy are dependent on
the competitive wage, a change in one part of the market will create a spiral
of adjustments.
4.0.2 Numeraire, or no numeraire
At this point we have obtained a model where production is homogenous in
three prices: Trade cost, the competitive wage, and the inverse of the mar-
ginal utility of income,1 see (3:15). This applies both in the Kreickemeier Me-
land output levels, and in the union wage equalisation output levels. While
t and wc are prices in the standard meaning,  1 is the marginal cost of
utility. At this point in the model presentation all present papers on GOLE
and UGOLE choose a numeraire. The most convenient price to normalise
is  1 because this consequently occurs together with the two other prices.
Because  1 is no ordinary price, this normalisation will lead to di¤erent
interpretations of the other prices. Wages become what Neary (2007) calls
wages deated by the marginal cost of utility. Under normalisation, the
interpretation of the output prices and trade costs, changes to prices and
costs at the margin.
In this thesis, mathematically, it mostly does not make a di¤erence to
bring  along. Because the interpretation changes when  is set to unity, we
will keep it in order to simplify the intuitive bit. There are some exceptions,
because  will be di¤erent in the two regimes, there are some occasions when
we need to make some assumptions. When we want to demonstrate the
di¤erence between Kreickemeier-Meland results and union wage equalisation
results,  and E will be two unknown variables that prevent us from reaching
a conclusion. We will present a way to solve these problems when we get to
them.








A point that can be made knowing this, even though retrospect, is that when




, we did not look at nominal sizes, but how the wage at
the margin is a¤ected by a change in trade costs at the margin. This does
not give a good intuitive understanding of what actually happens. However,
this turns out not to be very problematic. If we instead look at how the real
wage is a¤ected by changes in the real trade costs, we nd the same answer.
1Kreickemeier and Meland (2011)
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We will demonstrate this after we have derived the aggregate price level.
Even though w is not the true real wage, but it will behave like the true
real wage. This means that we can discuss the changes as changes in the real
wage, from a marginal change in the real trade cost.
4.1 The competitive wage in the two regimes
Total production is dependent on production in each sector and the size of
the sectors. The sectors are represented as di¤erent parts of the integral,
according to the illustration, (2:1). To nd the total production, we multiply
















4.1.1 The competitive wage in the Kreickemeier-Meland
model
As we already have determined the production specic to all sectors (3:15),





(2a  t  2wc) (n+ 1)
(2n+ 1) (n+ 2) b






+ (1  ) 

(a  wc)
2 (n+ 1) b

+ (  1) (   1)

(a  wc)
b (1 + n)

:
By denition, this is the equilibrium where all workers are employed. This
allows us to use this equation to solve for the competitive wage that clears
the market.
wc = a  2 (n+ 1)

t
 (2 + n  )
K
+ Lb





K  2 (2 + 2   (1 + ))+n (10 + 2  (5  ) )+n2 (4  2 (1  )) > 0:
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We can now look at general equilibrium e¤ects that inuence the economy




= 2 (n+ 1)
 (2 + n  )
K
: (4.3)
We nd that globalisation will make the competitive wage rise. This is
because the in the unionised, open sector will increase production and draw
labour from the competitive sector, thereby increasing the competitive wage.
A larger aggregate workforce (an increase in L) will lower the wage in
the competitive sectors as the extra workers will accumulate there. A higher
b will work much in the same way as a higher L because when consumers
purchase less, there will be less production, and reduced demand for labour.
As the e¤ects are caused by the same mechanism, both will later be referred
to as demand adjusted workforce.
4.1.2 The competitive wage under union wage equali-
sation
We nd the competitive wage under union wage equalisation in the same
manner as before, by deriving it from a state of general equilibrium, using





(2a  Et  2EwcE) (n+ 1)
(2n+ 1) (n+ 2) b






+ (1  ) 

2a (n+ 1) + Et  2EwcE (n+ 1)
2 (n+ 2) (n+ 1) b

+ (  1) (   1)

(a  wcEE)






E = a+ Et
 (2n+ 1 + )  2 (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
2 (n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1) (4.4)
  bL (2n+ 1) (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
n (n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1) :
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The competitive wage under union wage equalisation increases as bL de-
creases, as it did before implementing union wage equalisation. The e¤ect of
globalisation on the other hand, no longer is unambiguous. Depending on the
size or the sectors, the general equilibrium e¤ect can go in both directions.
This will be discussed in detail later on.
4.2 Union wages in the two regimes
Now that we have found the general equilibrium both with and without the
union wage equalisation model, we can insert the two competitive wages
into the union wages and compare and evaluate the e¤ects of union wage
equalisation.
4.2.1 Union wages in the Kreickemeier-Meland model
By inserting (4:2) into (3:4) we nd an expression for the union wage in the
shielded sector.
wus = a  (1 + n)

t
 (n+ 2  )
K
+ Lb




This expression, unlike (3:4) contains trade costs, and reveals how trade
costs will a¤ect the union wage in shielded sector indirect via the competitive
wage.
The union wage in shielded sector will increase as trade costs decrease.
This was expected, one can easily spot from (3:4) that changes that e¤ect wc
will inuence wus in the same direction.















When presented like this, we may observe the general equilibrium e¤ect of
trade cost on union wage as the second fraction, and the partial equilibrium
e¤ect of trade cost through the competitive wage in the third fraction. Both
will give a negative e¤ect on the union wage. The partial e¤ect we have
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discussed before. The general equilibrium e¤ect is also negative. The reason










It is interesting to note that the general equilibrium e¤ect pulls in the
same direction as the partial equilibrium e¤ect that Naylor found, and that
the aggregate e¤ect in the Kreickemeier-Meland model is actually stronger.
Even though the size of the sectors does not a¤ect the direction of the
general equilibrium e¤ect, they can inuence the strength. If the open sector
is small ( is small), the general equilibrium e¤ect will be small. Further, if
the open sector is su¢ ciently large ( is large), the general equilibrium e¤ect



























4.2.2 The common union wage under union wage equal-
isation









 (2n+ + 1)  2 (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
(n+ 2) 2
(n+ 1)
(n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1)
  bL(2n+ 1) (n+ 1)
n
(n+ 1)
(n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1) :
The second part is the partial e¤ect of trade cost on the union wage,
and we have established that this will always be negative. The third part
is the general equilibrium e¤ect of globalisation via wcE, and this can, as
mentioned be both negative and positive. The indirect e¤ect is su¢ ciently
4.3. UNION WAGE EQUALISATIONS EFFECTS ON WAGES 49







2n (n+ 2) +  (3  ) + (1  ) (2n+ 1)
2 (n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1) > 0:
4.3 Union wage equalisations e¤ects on wages
We are now close to the point where we can compare the union-wages and the
competitive wage in the Kreickemeier-Meland model, and under union wage
equalisation. But because of the issue with the di¤erent marginal utility of
income, we have to get a couple of things in order before we can get that far.
First, for reasons that will become apparent, we need to nd the aggregate
price levels, ( and E).
4.3.1 The aggregate price level
Before we can obtain the aggregate price level, we need the prices. These
are found by inserting total production with the competitive wage into (2:4).
We nd
Price Kreickemeier-Meland model



















































The rst moment of prices is found by inserting prices into their respective
part of the integral in (2:6). See appendix, A.3.1.
 = EE = a  Lb: (4.9)
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The general price level at the margin is determined solely by the di¤er-
ence between  and bL. More demand adjusted workers will give a lower price
level, because this will give higher production. Compared to the Kreickemeier-
Meland results, union wage equalisation will have no e¤ect on the aggregate
price level at the margin.
The e¤ect of a higher price at the margin in one sector will shift demand,
and the price di¤erence will be cancelled out by corresponding lower prices
at the margin in the rest of the economy. This happens no matter the size
of the sectors. The reason is that high output price at the margin in one
unionised sector cause low production/ labour demand. More workers will
end up in the competitive sectors, wages at the margin there will decline,
production will increase, and output price at the margin will go down. Lower
prices at the margin in unionised sectors, mean higher prices at the margin
in competitive sectors. Changes in the price at the margin forced through
under union wage equalisation, is perfectly compensated for by changes in
the price at the margin in the competitive sector. The general price level at
the margin remains as it was.
Because prices and income are di¤erent in the two regimes, the marginal
utility of income will be di¤erent. When we start comparing prices in the
two regimes, we need to get around this issue. As mentioned, we have three
prices in our model. Trade cost is the only one we treat as exogenous. This
is a little inaccurate because the three prices will operate in interaction with
each other. Therefore, one may argue that the trade costs are specic to
the regimes, and that they should be denoted tE and t.2 Knowing this,







:We have found that the aggregate price level at the margin
is identical in the two regimes, and we insert for (4:9) in the parts that do
not depend on endogenous sizes. We use (4:5) and (4:6), and nd that the
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2We will not actually denote trade costs according to regime. This is mostly unprob-
lematic, and we will adress the issue when it is problematic.
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(a  bL)
(2n+ 1) (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
n (n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1) :
Before we go further, we will get back to the issue of changes in wages
at the margin from a change in trade costs at the margin, versus changes
in real sizes. We can address this issue now because at this point we have
established that  is a constant.







= 2 (n+ 1)
 (2 + n  )
K
:
If we compare this to (4:3), we can conrm that the result is the same





, or real price at the margin, (w) :Because
wages are linear in trade cost, we get this result no matter what form of prices
we convert them into.
And now back to comparing the two real competitive wages.
4.3.2 Union wage equalisations e¤ect on the compet-
itive wage
When we converted the prices, the problem with the di¤erent trade cost is















(n+ 1) (2n+ 1)
K (a  bL) S1
> 0;
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where
S1 =
 (n+ 2) (2n+ 1) (1  )
(n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1) > 0:
We nd that the real competitive wage is strictly higher under union wage
equalisation. This should come as no surprise as in the Kreickemeier-Meland
model, the union wage in the shielded sector was higher than union wage
in open sector. Lower wages in one sector will, through partial equilibrium
e¤ects, lead to increased production and labour demand. The union will
draw workers from the competitive sectors, this will make the competitive
wage increase. The latter is the general equilibrium e¤ect.
The di¤erence between the two competitive wages decreases when the de-
gree of globalisation increases. Under union wage equalisation, the shielded,
unionised sector responds more strongly to a change in trade costs. Under
this regime, a lower t will induce a partial equilibrium e¤ect on the wage in
addition to the previous general equilibrium e¤ect through the competitive
wage. As a result the aggregate economy will be a¤ected harder when t
changes under union wage equalisation. The competitive wage will echo the
responsiveness in the rest of the economy, and thus, the competitive wage
under union wage equalisation will react stronger to globalisation.
The di¤erence also increases as the demand adjusted workforce increases.
A change in Lb a¤ects the union wage equalisation competitive wage more
than it a¤ects the competitive wage without the union wage equalisation
model. Compared to the real union wage in the shielded sector (3:4) the real
union wage in open sector (3:9) is more sensitive to changes in the market that
a¤ects the real competitive wage. With union wage equalisation, the open
sector real union wage will be used in both sectors, and this will produce an
economy where demand alterations will cause changes of a greater magnitude,
than without union wage equalisation.
4.3.3 Union wage equalisations e¤ect on the union
wages
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By forcing shielded sector to take on the same wage as open sector, one
would expect the two wages to end up somewhere between the two former
union wages. This would imply that the union wage in the open sector would
have to increase, and the only way this can happen, ceteris paribus, is by an
increase in the competitive wage.
We have found that compared to an economy where both unions choose
their own union wage, solidarity wages creates a higher real competitive wage,
and a lower common real union wage. Union wage equalisation thus produces
an economy where there is a smaller gap between the highest and the lowest
wage.
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Chapter 5
Welfare
We have shown that union wage equalisation has accomplished a more sol-
idaristic wage structure. So far, so good, but what we are looking for is
welfare implications. As discussed, in UGOLE, we need to look at the prices
when we want to evaluate welfare.
Modied wages will cause changes in production and consequently also
prices. As wages get compressed, prices in the di¤erent sectors will get com-
pressed. A smaller variance in prices considered as an isolated event leads to
lower consumer utility because the opportunity to substitute towards cheaper
goods is lost. This was rst demonstrated by Frederick Waugh (1944), and
was at that time quite opposite to common belief. He discovered that if the
consumer spent money across a series of periods, as long as the consumer has
a given sum of money and is indi¤erent to the allocation of money spent in
each period, the consumer will be better o¤ when the price is unstable. In
UGOLE, the dimension is a series of markets instead of a series of times, but
the theory still applies. The theory is founded on the fact that if the demand
is downward sloping in prices, the surplus lost from higher prices will always
be smaller than the surplus gained from equally lower prices.
This ts to our model in both regimes. We have discussed the indirect
utility function, and we found that bigger price variance increases utility
ceteris paribus, but we concluded that mathematically, it is easier to use
(2:8) where welfare depends negatively on the product 22. In order to do
this, we need to nd these in both regimes. For a detailed representation of
how these are derived, see appendix, A.4.1.
The un-centered price variance without union wage equalisation setting
is
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(n+ 2)2    (2n+ 3)

(tn (2  ) (1  )  bL4 (n+ 1))2
K2
+
(1  ) (4  3) (tn (2 + n  ) + bL (n+ 2) (2n+ 1))2
K2
:
The rst part represents the whole economy, while the second part rep-
resents only the open sector, and the third part represents only the shielded
sector.
Inserting for the union wage equalisation prices, gives us the second mo-
ment of prices with union wage equalisation.
2E
2
E = a (a  2bL) (5.2)
+ 
(2bL (n+ 1)  Etn (1  ))2
 
(n+ 2)2    (2n+ 3)

(2 + n  )2 (2n+ + 1)2




(2 + n  )2 (2n+ + 1)2
+ (1  ) (1  )
(Etn(2n(n+3) (2n+1) ( 4))+2bL(2n+1)(n+2)(n+1))2
4(n+1)2
(2 + n  )2 (2n+ + 1)2
Like before, the rst part represents the whole economy, and the second
part represents only the open sector. Under union wage equalisation, the new
wage in the shielded, unionised sector complicates the relationship between
the two shielded sectors, and we need to present them in two parts. The third
part represents the unionised shielded sector, and the forth part represents
the non-unionised, shielded sector.
5.1 Does union wage equalisation enhance wel-
fare?
Even though we have shown that utility depends positively of the un-centered
variance of prices, we have also established that we can use utility at the mar-
gin to evaluate whether union wage equalisation enhances welfare. Inserting
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the un-centered variance of prices into (2:8) yields the utility functions. For
the sake of visualisation, the question of welfare boils down to




Once again, before solving this, we need to take into account the issue
with the trade cost. Because we are looking at utility, we can not simply





we have found that  = EE, see (4:9) ; we also implicitly assumed that
t = EtE.
Henceforth, this assumption will be used in all calculations regarding
relative utility in the two regimes. We now have two indirect utility functions
that depend on the same variables, and we may solve the di¤erence.
It can be demonstrated that d
2
d(t)2
(UE   U) < 0, (see appendix, A.4.3)
thus, we know that the di¤erence in utility with and without union wage
equalisation is concave in trade costs. Knowing this, it is evident that as
long as the di¤erence is positive for the smallest and the highest level of
trade costs possible within this model, union wage equalisation will always
give higher welfare. The threshold levels of trade costs will be di¤erent in
the Kreickemeier-Meland version and in the union wage equalisation version
because of the di¤erent competitive wages. All threshold levels of trade costs
are found in the appendix, (A.4.2).
We nd that (UE   U) jt=0 > 0 and (UE   U) jt=tF > 0. (See appendix,
A.4.4 and A.4.5). We can conclude that union wage equalisation does in fact
yield higher utility for the consumers. This applies no matter the number of
rms in each sector, or the relative size of the sectors.
The reason is closely intertwined with the e¤ect on the un-centered vari-
ance of price on utility. As we just saw, the higher welfare with union wage
equalisation is brought on by lower un-centered price variance. A quick recap;
union wage equalisation forces the union in the shielded sector to implement
the wage from the open, unionised sector. This wage is lower than their op-
timal union wage. This gives a lower wage in the shielded, unionised sector,
which used to be the highest wage in the economy, and higher wages in all
other sectors. In other words, the wages were compressed.
Changing wages will lead to changes in production; the direction is pretty
straight forward and in accordance with the direction of the wage changes in
the di¤erent sectors. Intuitively it sounds plausible that compressed wages
and production costs lead to compressed prices. To be certain, we will check.
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To be able to look at the e¤ect of union wage equalisation wages, we rst
need to rank the production in the di¤erent sectors.
We nd that
yct > ycs > yut > yus :
(See appendix, A.4.6)
As all sectors face the same demand function (2:4), production changes in
the four sectors create price changes along the same scale, but in the opposite
direction. This implies that
pct 6 pcs < put < pus :














So, the highest price in the economy have decreased, whereas all of the
other prices has increased. This means that the prices have indeed been com-
pressed. This would explain the decrease in un-centered variance of prices
under union wage equalisation, but, this does not give su¢ cient information.
A decrease in aggregate price level could also be the reason for the decrease.
Luckily, in addition to the price variance, we have information on the price
level. We have shown that  is una¤ected by the rearrangements imple-
mented by union wage equalisation, so the average price level is constant.
In conclusion; union wage equalisation creates lower variance in price.
This alone gives lower welfare, but the positive e¤ect on welfare through




We will now look at what implications union wage equalisation have on the
e¤ect of globalisation. Within the UGOLE framework, globalisation can take
two forms, either the trade cost diminishes, making trade more attractive,
or the sector that produces tradable goods can increase in size, this can be
represented by an increase in . We have, and will, focus on lower trade
costs. We will look at what happens to wages in the di¤erent sectors and
welfare when trade costs sink. We have already shown Naylors result, that
partial equilibrium e¤ects will cause the union wage to increase as trade
costs decrease. We also found that union wages, both with and without
union wage equalisation increase with globalisation, because the sum of par-
tial and general equilibrium e¤ects always yields this result. When we look
at the general equilibrium e¤ects alone, in other words, when we look at
globalisation and competitive wages, the results are more complex. In the
Kreickemeier-Meland model, the general equilibrium e¤ects go in the same
direction as the partial equilibrium e¤ects. Under union wage equalisation
the general equilibrium e¤ect can, in some cases, go in the opposite direction
from the partial equilibrium e¤ects.






2 (n+ 1) (2 + n  )
K
> 0:
The equation demonstrates that globalisation causes the competitive wage
to increase, which means that the general equilibrium e¤ect from globalisa-
tion is positive. Production in rms in the shielded sectors will not change
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due to partial equilibrium e¤ects, but production in rms in the open sec-
tors will. A change in trade costs will, through partial equilibrium e¤ects,
increase production in rms in the open, unionised sector. See (3:15) :More
production gives higher employment level, and this leaves less workers in the
competitive sector. In the open, competitive sector, rms will also produce
more, driving labour demand up further. The extra labour demand will give
a higher competitive wage.







(n+ 2) (n+ 1)
(n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1)   
1
2 (n+ 2  ) :
With union wage equalisation, the competitive wage can both decrease
and increase under globalisation. The explanation lies in the general equi-
librium e¤ects. The Naylor model concept that we used to derive the partial
equilibrium could not nd this result, as general equilibrium e¤ects are ig-
nored, and the competitive wage is assumed to be exogenous.




, that direction of the e¤ect will









The graph shows the values of  and , where globalisation have no e¤ect
on the competitive wage for di¤erent values of n. From left to right when
n = 50, n = 10, n = 5; n = 2 and n = 1. To the right of the graph
globalisation has a positive e¤ect on wage. When n increases, the union
wages will close in on the competitive wages, and the area where the general
equilibrium e¤ect is negative will shrink.
If  is large, and  is small, the wage increases with globalisation. The
reasoning is the same as in the Kreickemeier-Meland model. This always
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no matter the size of the degree of unionisation, . (See appendix A.5.1)
If  is small, and  is large, globalisation decreases the wage. As this is
new to the model, it is consequently more intriguing. While a lower t still
a¤ects the competitive wage positively trough partial equilibrium e¤ects, the
general equilibrium e¤ect is so strong that it overrules the positive partial
equilibrium e¤ect.
The general equilibrium e¤ect is caused by changes in quanta produced in
each sector, as this determines the amount labour demanded. An adjustment
of trade costs increases labour demand in some sectors, while it decreases
labour demand in others. The bigger the sector is, the more the e¤ect on
this particular sector will inuence the economy.
So, what does it mean that  is small, and  is large? A small  means
that the open sector is small, and a large  means that a big proportion of
both open and shielded sectors are unionised.
Lower t will, as mentioned, give higher wages in open unionised sectors
when production costs sink, see (3:10) : New to union wage equalisation is
that rms in the shielded, unionised sector have the same wages, and now
rms in both unionised sectors will wish fewer workers. This will push labour
out into the non-union markets, and cause the competitive wage to drop.
When the shielded sector is su¢ ciently big, the positive e¤ect on the com-
petitive wage from higher labour demand in the open sector will be overruled
by the negative e¤ect from lower labour demand in the shielded sector. The
net e¤ect will be more workers in the competitive sectors, and lower wage.
As the number of rms increase, the market closes in on perfect compe-
tition, the union wage closes in on competitive wage. This will make the
general equilibrium e¤ects weaker, and a smaller proportion of the values for
 and  will impose a higher competitive wage. The graph illustrates this
point clearly.
6.1 Globalisation and welfare
By inserting the un-centered price variances (5:1) and (5:2) into the utility
function (2:8), we can look at what e¤ect globalisation has on welfare. There
is no general solution that applies for all levels of trade costs, but we can nd
unique solution for all levels of trade costs that we allow in this model. See
appendix (A.4.2) for trade costs levels.









We nd that globalisation will give lower consumer welfare. (See appendix
















The outcome is the same under union wage equalisation. (See appendix
A.5.3).
Compared to what we would realistically assume, the outcome in both
regimes is the opposite of what we would expect from globalisation. Appar-
ently, in this model, globalisation will make the un-centered variance of prices
increase, and give lower welfare. Like with welfare and un-centered variance
of prices, the intuition is distorted by ignoring the e¤ect through . Higher
price variance would give higher welfare. The reason for the lower welfare lies
somewhere else, in the general equilibrium e¤ect embedded in . By looking
at what happens with the prices in (4:8), we can nd the explanation.
First, let us consider the open sector. Globalisation will give the rms
in the open sectors less production costs and less market power, production
will increase, and prices will decrease.
In the shielded sector the opposite will happen. In the shielded sector,
globalisation will mean higher wages, and thus, prices will increase. This does
not necessarily apply for the non-unionised sector under union wage equal-
isation. Globalisation will inuence them only through general equilibrium
e¤ects, and as shown above, the competitive wage can go in both directions
depending on the size of the di¤erent sectors. This ambiguous e¤ect is an
interesting implication of union wage equalisation, but, it is not large enough
to inuence the nal result
In short, globalisation makes the highest prices (shielded sector) higher
(with the one exception), and the lowest prices (open sector) lower. This
means more variance in prices, which ceteris paribus gives higher welfare.
But, another e¤ect through  is so strong that it drowns out this positive
e¤ect. Like we found in the welfare argumentation, the higher price variance
inuences the marginal utility of income negatively. When taking this e¤ect
into account, we detect that the lower welfare from globalisation must be
caused by an increase in the di¤erence between prices and income (a  Ib).
Chapter 7
Problems
There are three main concerns that should be mentioned when combining
UGOLE and union wage equalisation. The rst has to do with the structure
of the unions we have to use in UGOLE, and how the common union wage
decided upon. The second is tied to the UGOLEmodel in partial equilibrium,
and the third is tied to UGOLE in general equilibrium.
7.1 The centralisation argument
So, we have found that union wage equalisation in UGOLE will give higher
competitive wage and higher welfare. This sounds like the exact result that
Aukrust and Lindbeck was trying to achieve. Unfortunately in UGOLE, this
way of implementing solidaristic wages has one major aw. The theory was
that by making unionisation more centralised, national implications of wage
setting should be taken into consideration to a much bigger extent. This
has not happened, the wage is still determined, though identically, by an
continuum of small unions in the open sector. Even though the new union
wage does end up between the two former union wages, this is a result of
general equilibrium adjustments, and not of regards for both unionsinterests.
A likely assumption would be that a wage set under cooperation between the
two union types would, in partial equilibrium, be higher than the open union
wage. How it would end up compared to the union wage equalisation wage
we have derived here is hard to predict.
When using the UGOLE framework, it is impossible to assume one large
union that will set the wage based on how it will inuence more than one
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market. This model is based on the assumption that all agents are small in
the economy, and will ignore the general equilibrium e¤ects of their behav-
iour, thus take the competitive wage as given. Therefore, it is impossible
to solve a model where we assume a union that will operate with the best
interest of both sectors in mind. Even though the outcome might not be
perfect, something seems to have gone right. The new union wage does lie in
between the two previous union wages. This is because of an adjusted com-
petitive wage, and not because of more centralised wage bargaining. Despite
that the union incentives in UGOLE are not spot on, they still leave us with
an opportunity to evaluate the welfare e¤ect of wages more in the direction
of solidaristic wage setting than the starting point, so there is no reason to
render the analysis worthless.
An argument that works in favour of our approach, is one of Moenes1
points presented in the introduction. According to him, the union in the
open sector would have to set the base for the wage negotiations, otherwise
the export industry would su¤er. If implementing solidaristic wage setting,
in practise means letting the union in the opens sector set the wage, and
then demand that the shielded sector follow suit, this is in accordance with
union wage equalisation in UGOLE.
7.2 Capital ight
A drastic simplication in this model is that we assume identical countries,
and no capital ight. The competitive wage is determined by labour demand,
while any competition between workers is assumed nonexistent. In order
to minimise costs, rms would choose the cheapest accessible production.
An important implication of globalisation therefore would be that rms in
unionised sectors would, if trade costs are su¢ ciently low, move production
or part of the production abroad. This would create competition between
workers. In order to avoid losing their jobs, they would accept lower wages.
Even though union wage equalisation did in fact explain how globalisation
in some cases would induce lower competitive wages, this result was due
to shifts in labour demand within the di¤erent sectors, in cases where the




Naylors result, and the result found here, when union wage equalisation
was not adopted, is that wages across all sectors increase when trade costs
sink. An intuitively likely consequence of this will be that as rms will have
higher costs, they would be inclined to look for cheaper solutions. As men-
tioned in the introduction, it has been demonstrated by Lommerud, Meland
and Sørgard (2003) that capital ight can in fact be caused by unionisa-
tion. Their nding is that at some point, even though lower trade costs
make export more protable, if the union wage gets high enough, the foreign
competition will be so strong that rms will prefer to move all production
abroad.
7.3 Unemployment
We have used a framework where no unemployment is assumed. This is espe-
cially problematic because when we implement union wage equalisation, this
most certainly should a¤ect the employment level. In addition, historically,
the employment level was an important argument in favour of solidaristic
wage setting.
Assuming unemployment in UGOLE is fully possible, but unemployment
also means that we would need to implement some form of support for the
unemployed, e.g. a tax (that would a¤ect production, and give e¢ ciency
loss), and this is problematic. In one respect, this posts no big problem. One
of our important results is that welfare increases with union wage equalisa-
tion. Union wage equalisation also yields a higher competitive wage. When
this wage increases it is because of higher aggregate labour demand. This
would mean, if we had allowed for it, lower unemployment, and less of the
e¢ ciency distorting tax. It is a likely conclusion that this would increase
welfare further.
On the matter of globalisation and welfare on the other hand, it is hard
to predict how unemployment would a¤ect the outcome. Globalisation will
increase the union wage in the Kreickemeier-Meland model, and unemploy-
ment would sink. This should increase welfare, and thus the e¤ect would go
in the opposite direction of what we found. Under union wage equalisation,
the e¤ect from globalisation on the competitive wage is unambiguous, and
globalisation can both increase and decrease the unemployment.
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Chapter 8
Concluding remarks
In this thesis, we have tested the welfare implications of solidaristic wage
setting. In addition, we have used the results to evaluate how union wage
equalisation will a¤ect the implications of globalisation. What distinguishes
our approach compared to other investigations of solidaristic wage setting
is that we have used a fairly new model that can encompass both strategic
behaviour and general equilibrium, namely UGOLE. We have used a version
of this model developed by Kreickemeier and Meland. In their framework, the
economy is divided into four sectors, one open and one closed part, and within
each of these there is a unionised and a non-unionised part. This framework
demonstrates how oligopolistic competition will lead to reciprocal dumping
and thus higher union wages in the shielded sector than in the open sector.
This is one of the main arguments for imposing solidaristic wage setting.
The UGOLE setup allows us to distinguish between two di¤erent e¤ects
that inuence the endogenous factors in the economy, partial and general
equilibrium e¤ects. What separates UGOLE from other general equilib-
rium models, is that the partial equilibrium e¤ects spring from markets with
oligopolistic competition. Each rm is small in the economy, and we assume
them to consider the competitive wage as exogenous. They will optimise
behaviour according to partial equilibrium conditions. General equilibrium
e¤ects will arise when the unions adjust wages and this leads the rm to
change their number of employees. This will change the size of the workforce
in the competitive sectors, and thus change the competitive wage. Changes
in the competitive wage will create changes in all other prices and wages,
this is the general equilibrium e¤ect. When we have oligopolistic competi-
tion in the partial markets, the model can demonstrate the e¤ect of di¤erent
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degrees of market power by changing the number of rms in the market. In
other monopoly models, the rm behaviour could be adjusted by considering
a change in demand elasticity. This entails changing the consumer utility,
and a change in this is an unlikely assumption.
Because we have chosen a path almost parallel to Kreickemeier and Me-
land (2011), our results have to be viewed in the light of theirs. We im-
plemented solidaristic wages in this framework by forcing the union in the
shielded sector to o¤er the optimal union wage for the open sector. We
found that union wage equalisation leads to a union wage situated between
the two Kreickemeier-Meland union wages and that the wage in the competi-
tive sectors rose. Compared to their results, ours indicate that the aggregate
welfare level increases with an solidaristic wage structure. This is in line with
the ideology behind this kind of wage setting, but in the mechanics within
UGOLE, the result is more unexpected. More equalised wages lead to more
equal prices. In accordance with classic theory, this gives the consumers
less opportunity to substitute towards the cheaper goods, thus making them
worse o¤. However, it turns out that the general equilibrium e¤ect of the
wage compression will increase the income relative to prices. The unexpected
result is that the change in wages and prices works to such an extent that it
will drown out the e¤ect of the price variance, and the aggregate utility will
be higher under union wage equalisation.
We also found, like in Kreickemeier and Meland, that globalisation will
give a lower level of welfare. Globalisation will increase production in the
open sector relative to production in the shielded sector, thus creating larger
price dispersion between the two, and higher variance of prices. This alone
would give higher welfare, but globalisation will also trigger a general equi-
librium e¤ect that gives lower income relative to price level. The general
equilibrium e¤ect is larger than the partial equilibrium e¤ect on price vari-
ance, and this is why globalisation creates a lower level of welfare.
When looking at how union wage equalisation will inuence globalisation,
we found one result that stood out compared to the Kreickemeier-Meland
model. Without union wage equalisation, globalisation will increase produc-
tion and labour demand. More labour in the unionised sectors gives less
labour and higher wages in the competitive sector. Under union wage equal-
isation, the outcome is no longer unambiguous. In this case, the union in
the shielded sector has a wage that increases with globalisation, but rms
in the union have no reason, (due to partial equilibrium e¤ects), to increase
production. If this sector is big enough, the aggregate labour demand will
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decrease, thus making the competitive wage decrease.
The biggest objection against UGOLE as an instrument for evaluating
solidaristic wage setting, is that the union does not act on behalf of the
economy as a whole, as would be plausible to assume. This is a problem
because the common union wage will not be derived from the best interest
of the entire economy, but only the interests of the unionised, open sector.
When using UGOLE, it is impossible to t the ideology of solidaristic wage
setting into the model in a more adequate way, because, by denition, no
agents in the economy will comprehend their inuence on general equilibrium
e¤ects. Still, we have argued that even though we can not derive the centrally
decided optimal wage, we have found, and evaluated the e¤ect of a wage
more in accordance with solidaristic wage setting. An additional argument
in favour of this way of implementing solidaristic wage setting is that in order
for the open sector to maintain a competitive export industry, they should
set the standard for the common union wage.
A second objection, this time against UGOLE as developed so far, is that
it does not take into account capital ight. If countries are not identical,
globalisation would give incentives to move production to places were wages
are lower, this would likely create a wage competition amongst workers.
And the last main objection; it is hard to allow for unemployment in
this version of UGOLE. This is problematic because it might have given us
di¤erent answers when we look at the e¤ect of union wage equalisation on
globalisation.
Further research We have analysed the welfare e¤ects from union wage
equalisation on one representative individual. This enables us to look at ag-
gregate welfare e¤ects. But, income will be di¤erent according to whether the
individuals are capital owners or workers, and if they are workers; what sector
they work in. Union wage equalisation will give the workers in the shielded,
unionised sector lower wage, while the rest will receive higher wages. In ad-
dition, globalisation will inuence the capital owners income as rm prots
will change. The impact of union wage equalisation and globalisation on the
individual welfare varies with sector size and trade cost level, and further
investigations on this individual welfare level would give some interesting,
new insights.




A.1.1 Deriving the indirect utility
Simplication of the indirect utility of the representative consumer is found
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A.2
A.2.1 Deriving the highest level of trade cost that gives
an equilibrium in the model
Before going into the details, we will briey go through the relationship
between union wage in the open sector and the trade cost level. Unions
whish high employment in the unionised rms, and a union wage that is high
compared to the competitive wage. We see from (3:1) that rents are high
when the union wage is high, or when employment is high, and of course
when both are high, but that is not an option in this model.
When trade costs are low, a low union wage is the best option. This will
induce high employment in the rms. The union will be better o¤ because
the high level of employment will make up for the low wage. When trade
costs increase, production, and thus employment in the rms, sink, and the
union will reply by slightly lowering the union wage. When the trade costs
reach a certain level, employment in the rm will sink to the extent that
the union will be better o¤ by changing strategy. The new strategy is to
stop holding the wage low to induce exports, instead raising the wage by a
substantial amount, which would cause the rms to stop exporting, but may
still be better in terms of union rent. As in Naylor (1999), there will be
no equilibrium in pure strategies when there exists one-sided incentives to
deviate from the double exportsequilibrium wage.
We will now will derive this threshold level of trade costs. There is more
than one way to do this; we will use the method in Bastos and Kreickemeier
(2009).
To get the notation in place: The union in open sector can choose between
two strategies, a high-wage strategy, that yields utility rent level 
Ht , and a
low wage strategy that yields utility rent level 
Lt . We assume symmetrical
countries, thus the competitive wage is the same in both countries. When
trade costs reach a certain level that we will call t, the high wage strategy
and the low wage strategy yields the same level of union rents. To nd this
trade cost level, we need to start by nding the union-rent levels.
High wage strategy
The union will choose a high wage strategy that gives the highest possible
level of union rents when there is no export. The union whishes to optimise
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where wH denotes the wage in the high wage strategy. Optimising the
equation yields
wH =
a+ n (w + t) + wc (n+ 1)
2 (n+ 1)
:
We nd that this wage depends on the union wage in the foreign country.
This is because if the union wage in the foreign country chooses a higher wage
level, there will be less imports into the domestic market. This will increase
the production, and employment in the domestic rms, and the union will
implement a slightly higher union wage. Some of the additional employment
will disappear, but not all, and this way the union can achieve a higher
union wage and higher employment in the rms. This will give the union
more union rents.
By inserting wH into the union utility, we get the union rent level the
union accomplished by the high wage strategy.

Ht =
(a+ n (w + t)  wc (n+ 1))2 n
4 (n+ 1) (2n+ 1) b
:
Low wage strategy
The low wage strategy is found by optimising union wage when there is
export. We have assumed that t is under the level where we can nd an
equilibrium, and that the union in the open sector in this model has chosen
the low wage strategy. The optimal wage in this case is (3:8). Inserting this
into the union utility, (3:1) when l (z) = y1 (z) + y2 (z)from (3:5), gives us
the union rent obtained by the low wage strategy.

Lt = n
( (t  2nw) + 2wc (n+ 1)  2a)2
8 (n+ 1) (2n+ 1) b
:
How much rents the domestic union obtains from inducing trade, depends
on whether or not rms in the other country will trade. We need to nd the
foreign union wage where both strategies give the domestic union the same
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level of rents. This is obtained by setting 
L = 
H . We solve for w. This
gives us two solutions
(i) :
w =
































(2n+ 1) + 1
2n
< 0
A lower tmakes exports more favourable, whilst lower w makes export
less favourable. To make the domestic union indi¤erent at this exact level of
w, d
dt
w must be negative. This occurs in (ii).
The foreign union wage (switching wage) that makes the domestic union
indi¤erent to whether the rms exports is
w =






The switching wage is increasing in trade costs. The optimal union wage
under trade, (3:9) ; is decreasing in t. The threshold level where the union
is indi¤erent between diverging from inducing trade, and inducing trade is
where these two wages are equal. wut = w
 yields
t = 4
(a  wc) (n+ 1)








A.2.2 Deriving the highest level of trade costs where
rms export
The rms will engage in trade as long as exports yield prots. The lowest
possible wage in the economy, is the wage in the competitive sectors. We
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can obtain the trade cost level where rms will trade even at the competitive
wage. The optimisation problem has already given us the optimal export level
(3:6). Finding the trade cost level where rms are indi¤erent to exporting
or not, is straight forward. It is given by the level of optimal production in
the open sector where y2 = 0. Assuming symmetry in export and wages, and
inserting for the wage in this sector, wc, gives us the optimal export:
y2i (z) =
a  wc   t (n+ 1)
b (2n+ 1)
= 0;






A.3.1 Deriving the aggregate price levels,  and EE
The aggregate price level is found by splitting up the integral, and inserting





= put +  (1  )pct + (1  ) pus + (1  ) (1  )pcs
= 
 




n (n+ 1) (2  ) (1  )
K
!
+  (1  )

a  Lb4 (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
K
+ t
n (n+ 2) (2  ) (1  )
K

+ (1  ) 

a  Lb(n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
K
  t (2 + n  )n
K

+ (1  ) (1  )

a  Lb2 (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
K




We use the same procedure to obtain the union wage equalisation aggre-
gate price level.







tE +  (1  )EpctE




n (n+ 1) (1  )
(2 + n  ) (2n+ + 1)   bL
2 (n+ 1)2
(2 + n  ) (2n+ + 1)
!























We nd that both in both regimes, the aggregate price level at the margin
depends only on a, b and L.
A.3.2 Ranking by size the union wages in the two
regimes
Now we will compare the union wages in the Kreickemeier-Meland model, and
under union wage compression. Like when we looked at competitive wages,
















((n+ 2) (2n+ 1) (1  ) +  (n+ 2 + n (2n+ 3)))




(n+ 1) (2n+ 1) ((n+ 2) (2n+ 1) (1  ) +  (2n2 + n+ 3n + 2))










(2n (n+ 1) + 2n (2  ) + (+ 1) (2  ))  (n+ 1) (2n+ 1) (1  )




(n+ 1) (2n+ 1)  (n+ 1) (2n+ 1) (1  )
(n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1)K
> 0:
We nd that the real union wage under union wage compression will end











A.4.1 Deriving the un-centered variance of prices, 2
and 2E
The second moments of prices are obtained by inserting the price functions
into their respective sectors.
In the Kreickemeier-Meland model, the sector wise prices that add up to
the un-centered variance of prices are





=  (put )
2 +  (1  ) (pct)
2 + (1  )  (pus )








n (n+ 1) (2  ) (1  )
K
!2
+  (1  )

a  Lb4 (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
K
+ t
n (n+ 2) (2  ) (1  )
K
2
+ (1  ) 

a  Lb(n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
K
  t (2 + n  )n
K
2
+ (  1) (   1)

a  Lb2 (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
K




and this collapses into




(n+ 2)2    (2n+ 3)

(tn (2  ) (1  )  bL4 (n+ 1))2
K2
+
(1  ) (4  3) (bL (n+ 2) (2n+ 1) + tn (2 + n  ))2
K2
:
The rst part represents the whole economy. In the two shielded sectors,
the prices will behave similar enough for us to collapse them into the second
part. The two open sectors will also behave fairly similar, and collapses into
the third part.
Under union wage equalisation the sector wise prices that add up to the












2 +  (1  ) (EpctE)
2
+ (1  )  (EpusE)





n (n+ 1) (1  )
(2 + n  ) (2n+ + 1)   bL
2 (n+ 1)2
(2 + n  ) (2n+ + 1)
!2
+  (1  )

a+ Et
n (n+ 2) (1  )
(2 + n  ) (2n+ + 1)   bL
2 (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
(2 + n  ) (2n+ + 1)
2
















E = a (a  2bL)
+ 
(2bL (n+ 1)  Etn (1  ))2
 
(n+ 2)2    (2n+ 3)

(2 + n  )2 (2n+ + 1)2




(2 + n  )2 (2n+ + 1)2
+ (1  ) (1  )
(Etn(2n(n+3) (2n+1) ( 4))+2bL(2n+1)(n+2)(n+1))2
4(n+1)2
(2 + n  )2 (2n+ + 1)2
:
here too, the rst part represents the whole economy, and the components
that represents the shielded sector collapses into the second part. Because
we have imposed an "unnatural" wage into the open, unionised sector, the
two open sectors can no longer be collapsed into one part. The third part
represents the open, unionised sector, and the fourth part represents the open
competitive sector.
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A.4.2 Regime specic threshold levels of trade costs
We have found two partial equilibrium threshold level of trade costs, t and
t. Because the expressions we obtained depend on the competitive wage,
it will be di¤erent in the two regimes.
We start with the lowest threshold level t; from (3:13) : We nd the
levels in the two regimes by inserting for wc and EwcE from (4:2) and (4:4).
Because these depend on trade costs, we need to solve for t and EtE again.
This way, we obtain the union threshold trade cost in the Kreickemeier-
Meland model,(t), and with union wage equalisation (EtE):
t =




















2n (n  ) + (1 + ) (3n  ) + 4+ 2
p




If we compare the threshold levels we nd that




































These threshold levels spring from the actions of the unions in the open
sector. The only factor that separates the union wage in the open sector
in the two regimes, is the di¤erent competitive wage, (both use (3:9)) This
union wage increases with the competitive wage. Because the competitive
wage is higher under union wage equalisation, production is more costly. This






The second threshold level t; is given by (3:14). Substituting for the
competitive wages, wc and EwcE then solving for t and EtE, reveals the
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threshold trade cost where rms refrain from export in the Kreickemeier-
Meland model (t), and with union wage equalisation (EtE ).
t = 2 (n+ 2) b
L
((n+ 2) (2  ) + n)n; (A.2)
Et

E = 2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) b
L
(2n (n  ) + 6n+ 4     )n:
Where by the same reasoning as to why EtE < t
, we nd that.
t   EtE =
bL2 (1 + n2 + n) (1  ) (n+2)
(2n n+n+4 2)






The relationship between t and tE is hard to determine, but otherwise,











The absolute lowest threshold level occurs under union wage equalisation.
We need to be sure that an equilibrium exists in both regimes. This means
that whenever we compare the two, we need to assume t < EtE.
A.4.3 Proof that UE   U is concave in t
In order to conclude if wage equalisation giver higher welfare, we start with
@2
@(t)2
(UE   U). According to the pervious presented argumentation, we as-
sume t = EtE. We nd that the di¤erence is concave in trade cost, and
thus, as long as the expression is positive in the corner solutions, we know




22 into (2:8) in the two di¤erent regimes yields






  4 (+ 1) (2  ) (14+ 1) (1  )
  12
 
 (3  ) + 2 (2  ) + 2
 
2n4     1





7 (1  ) (2  ) +  (3  2)
 
72 + 52  39

+ 222 (11  3)

  4n2 (1  ) (9 (1  ) + 16 (1  ) +  (9  2) + 37)
  n2 (1  )
 














43 (1  ) (2  ) + 
 
1522 + (1  )
 








22 (1  ) (2  ) + 
 






39   252 + 43





(1  ) (2  ) + 
 




7   22 + 1







n ((2   (1 + )) + 2+ 2n (2  ) + 2n + 2n2)
b (n+ 1)2 (2 + n  )2 (2n+ 1 + )2K2
> 0:
We nd that @
2
@(t)2
(UE   U) is strictly negative.
A.4.4 Proof that UE   U is positive when t = 0
One corner solution is t = 0. We nd that when there are no trade costs,
union wage equalisation yields higher welfare:
A.4. 83
(UE   U) jt=0
S3
=
+ 8 (2  ) (1 + ) (+ (1  ) (4+ 1))
+ n4 (1  )
 
29  14 + 6 (19  5) + 2 (53  4)

+ n122 (3+ 4)





96  52   57










73  442 + 39














(1  ) (19  4) + 
 








bL2n (2n+ 1) (1  )
2 (2 + n  )2 (2n+ + 1)2K2
> 0:
We nd that (UE   U) jt=0 is strictly positive.
A.4.5 Proof that UE   U is positive when t = tE
The other corner solution is t = tE. This is the highest possible level of
trade costs where we can obtain an equilibrium under union wage equalisa-
tion. To make the expressions more tidy we will use tE . We can do this
because we know that UE  U is concave in trade costs. Therefore, when we
know that (UE   U)jt=0 > 0, and can prove that (UE   U)jt=EtE > 0, we





we know that (UE   U)jt=EtE > 0
When we insert for tE from (A:2) ; we nd.
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2 (16  40 + 172) + 2 (1  ) (20  7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(1  ) (203  73) + 2 (322   115 + 91)




(1  ) (245  86) + 2 (17 + 9  62)









2 (1  ) (5  ) + 
 
6   22 + 1

+ n64 ( + 1  ) ;
where
S4 =
L2b2 (1 + n+ n2) (1  )
(2n2 + 2n (3  ) + 4     )2K2
> 0:
The three rst parts can be both positive and negative depending on 
and . The last four parts are strictly positive. The parts that are positive,
are the ones where n has the the highest exponents. We need to show that
the expression is positive for any value of n  (1;1). By taking the derivative
of more than the 2th order the three rst paragraphs will disappear, and we
know the rest of the expression is positive. We call the rest of the expression
G1. To prove that G1 is positive we have to use the fact that if an equation
is increasing in one of its component, it is enough to prove that is is positive
for the smallest value of that component. Corresponding reasoning yields if
an equation is decreasing in a component. If neither of these conditions are
fullled, we have no information about the index sign of the equation.
















2 (828 + 60   (100 + 27 + 119+ 98))
+ 54 (1  ) (84  25)
> 0:
We know that d
2
dn2
G1 is strictly positive. This means that ddnG1 increases






117+ 302+ 902 + (1026   (684 + 157))

+ 81 (1  ) (25  8) > 0:
d
dn
G1jn=1 is positive. This implies that ddnG1 is strictly positive, and that
G1 increase as n increase. G1 is always positive if it is positive when n = 1:
G1jn=1 = 3 (   3) (81 (   1) + 2 (17   27)) + 2
 
81 + 552   158

:
To prove that G1jn=1 is positive we need to take a few more steps. We
have to start with the second derivative with respect to :
d2
d2
(G1jn=1) = 486 + 1102 + 204 > 0:
d2
d2
(G1jn=1) is always positive, this means that dd (G1jn=1) increases as
 increases, and is always negative if it is negative when  = 1
d
d
(G1jn=1) j=1 =  486  264  482 < 0:
d
d
(G1jn=1) is always negative, so G1jn=1 decreases as  increases. G1jn=1
is always positive if it is positive when  = 1:
G1jn=1;=1 = 2 (60  11) > 0:
G1jn=1 is therefore always positive. At this point, we can conclude that
(UE   U) jt=tE > 0:
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A.4.6 Ranking of production level in all sectors in the
Kreickemeier-Meland model
First we consider production in the two unions, from (3:15).
yut   yus
=
L (2n2 + 3n+ 2)
Kn
  t(n (2 +       ) + 2  )
Kb
:
There is no solution that applies for all values of t. We can see that if
t is su¢ ciently small, production is always bigger in the open sector. In our
model we have an upper limit for t. If we can demonstrate that production
in the open sector is bigger for this level of trade costs, we can conclude that
production is always higher in the open sector. Because (yut   yus ) jt=t > 0
implies (yut   yus ) jt=t > 0, we can use t from (A:2) in appendix A.4.2.
yut   yus jt=t
=
L
n+ (2  ) (n+ 2) > 0:
We nd that production within the unions is always higher in the open









  t(2  ) (n+ 2) + n
Kb
:
By the same reasoning as production in the unionised sector, we insert
for t (A:2).
yct   ycsjt=t = 0:
At this level of trade cost, production is equal. The result should come




As we will only allow for a level of trade cost lower than t, namely t,
production is always higher (or equal) in the open sector.
Now we can compare the highest production level of the competitive
sectors and the lowest production level of the unionised sectors.










We nd that production is always higher in the competitive sector. And
sorted by production volume, the order of the sectors is
yct > ycs > yut > yus :
A.4.7 Price changes due to union wage equalisation
Obtaining the changes in prices brought forward by union wage equalisation,


















=  nt (2n (1 + n) + (2  ) (+ 2n+ 1)) + 2Lb (n+ 1) (2n+ 1)
2 (n+ 1) (2 + n  ) (2n+ + 1)K
< 0;
where




tE   put = n (1  ) (n+ 1)
t (2  ) + (2Lb(2n+1)+2tn)(n+1)
(2n++1)
(2 + n  )K
> 0;
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Ep
c
tE   pct = (n+ 2)n (1  )
t (2  ) + 2 (n+ 1) (bL(2n+1)+nt)
(2n++1)





sE   pcs = n (n+ 2) (2n+ 1) (1  )
t (2  ) + 2(n+1)(bL(2n+1)+nt)
(2n++1)
2 (n+ 1) (2 + n  )K
> 0:
A.5




> 0 under union
wage equalisation
The relationship between the competitive wage under union wage compres-






2 (n2 + 3n+ 2)   (2n+ + 1)
2 (n+ 2  ) (2n+ + 1) :




> 0. First we need general










If this is positive for  = 1, it is positive for all values of : The di¤erence
in the numerator increases with n, so if it is positive for n = 1, it is positive






















We nd that as long as the open sector is larger than approximately 27%,
the competitive wage under union wage compression will always increase with
globalisation.






which demonstrates that globalisation has a negative e¤ect on utility in
the Kreickemeier-Meland model. The e¤ect is found by inserting (5:1) into




+ tn2 (1  ) n
2 (2 (1  ) +  + 4 (1  )) + (4  3) (2  )2
K2b
+ tn2 (1  ) 2n (2  ) (
2 + (1  ) ( + 4))
K2b
  Lbn (1  ) n
2 (1  ) + 16 (n+ 1) (1  )
K2b
  Lbn (1  ) 3n
2 + 2 (n3   2) + 2 (2n2 + 5n+ 6)
K2b
:
There is no general solution to if welfare sinks with globalisation. We nd
that if trade costs are su¢ ciently low, the expression will be negative, and
welfare will decrease as the level of globalisation increases. In this model we
have limited trade costs to 0 < t < EtE , this means that as long as this
expression is negative when t = EtE, it will always be negative. This will
also apply to t because EtE < t
. Because t this expression is more




Ln2 (1  ) (n+ )
K (n (n+ 2) (2  ) + n) < 0:
We can conclude that globalisation always gives lower welfare.
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which demonstrates that globalisation has a negative e¤ect on utility also
under union wage equalisation. We use the same procedure as above. The
e¤ect on utility from a change in tE is found by inserting (5:2) into (2:8),
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2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 (2n+ 1)2 +  (4n4   3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n2 (13  9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2 (n+ 1)2 b
+ tn
8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) + n2 (3  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) (1 + 4n (n+ 1  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2 (2 + n  )2 (2n+ 1 + )2
By the same reasoning as before; if trade costs are su¢ ciently low, we
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We have to start with d
2
dd
G2 to prove that G2 is negative. We nd that
@2
@@





G2 increases as  increases. This means that if ddG2 is negative





2  6 < 0:
G2 decreases when  increases. If G2 is negative in  = 0, it is always
negative.
G2j=0 =   (1  ) < 0:
We can conclude that G2 is always negative.
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